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Abstract
This thesis investigates whether ESG Score announcements by Thomson Reuters present
new information to investors in the Nordic region. The data set consists of 1278 unique
events for 309 unique firms publicly noted in either Sweden, Denmark, Norway or Finland
in the time period from 2011 to 2020. ESG Score announcements are viewed relative
to the score from the previous year, and segmented into positive, negative, and neutral
events based on the magnitude of change. Positive events have a year-on-year change
of at least 10.61 percent, while negative events have a year-on-year change of less than
-2.77 percent. We apply event study methodology and define a test battery consisting
of a parametric and a non-parametric test, yielding a test battery robust to flaws in our
data set. We found evidence of positive abnormal stock price reactions in days prior to
the announcement of both positive and negative events. Therefore, we find evidence that
the ESG Score might bring new information to investors. Furthermore, probit regressions
are used to examine whether firm characteristics correlate with stock price reactions. We
find evidence that smaller firms have a higher likelihood of positive abnormal stock price
reactions in days prior to positive and negative events. Moreover, positive events dated
2017 or later, have a higher likelihood of positive stock price reactions in the days prior to
the events. The same effect, meaning a positive relationship between the likelihood of
positive abnormal price reactions and events dated 2017 or later, is also present for the
day prior to negative events.
Keywords – ESG Score, event study, firm characteristics, probit regression.
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1 Introduction
Sustainability has become an increasingly relevant term for investors and firms. The
sustainability of a firm is, however, not easily measured. Its interpretation varies, depending
on an individual’s definition of sustainability as well as the perception of a firm’s sustainable
initiatives.
Evaluating sustainability in investments is developing from being considered a niche, to
an important evaluation point in a majority of investment decisions. Intergovernmental
actions, such as the United Nations development goals (United Nations, 2020), are
contributing to increase the awareness of sustainability among investors.
For example, mutual funds which evaluate firms on sustainability are predicted
to make up almost 60 percent of total mutual fund assets in Europe come 2025
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2020). When investors are to include sustainability in their
investments decisions, a more common approach to evaluate sustainability is needed.
Several agencies have developed metrics to measure the ESG1 initiatives of a firm, which
may be used to help investors evaluate sustainability.
Thus, it becomes interesting to measure the impact each ESG metric has on stock prices.
The effect of Thomson Reuters’ ESG Score (hereafter ESG Score) is particularly interesting,
as Thomson Reuters is one of the largest providers of professional information.
The effect of the ESG Score may vary across geography, and observed stock price reactions
could therefore differ depending on the market(s) examined. Nordic countries present
interesting markets for examining the impact of the ESG Score for two major reasons.
Firstly, implementing sustainability in investments decisions have a long history in the
region (Alfred Berg, 2020). Secondly, the Nordic countries have a vision of becoming the
most sustainable region in the world by 2030 (Nordic Council, 2020).
This thesis examines the short-term effect of the ESG Score on stock prices in Nordic
countries2. The thesis is structured as follows: A short explanation of the ESG score
and the main methodology applied in this thesis is provided in Section 1.1 and Section
1.2. In Section 2, a literature review of existing research on the topic is presented. Our
1ESG stands for Environmental, Social and Governance.
2Nordic countries are hereby defined as Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland.
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research questions, including hypotheses based on existing literature are presented in
Section 3. Furthermore, the main methodology of use is elaborated on in Section 4, before
the data of interest is presented in Section 5. Thereafter, empirical findings and analysis
are presented in Section 7, and summarised in Section 8.
1.1 ESG Score
According to a report published by Sustainable Insight Capital Management (2016),
there are more than 100 ESG rating providers. Agencies such as MSCI, Sustainalytics,
Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters are categorized as the primary rating providers.
With more than 9000 public firms worldwide and 2100 firms in Europe, Thomson Reuters
offers one of the largest databases on ESG Scores, and the database has been used in several
empirical studies (Ioannou and Serafeim (2010); Cheng et al. (2014); Drempetic et al.
(2020)). The ESG Score consists of three equally weighted pillars - environmental, social
and governmental – resulting in a metric ranging from zero to one hundred. Environmental
refers to the firm’s impact on the environment, measured by metrics such as pollution and
CO2 emission. The social pillar includes the firm’s focus on the working environment and
equality. The governance pillar reflects the firm’s work on tax strategy, corruption and
risk management. Each pillar is measured with more than 450 data points, such as water
usage and human rights policies, and all data points are based on public information
(Refinitiv, 2020). The ESG Score is published in the Thomson Reuters database once a
year.
1.2 Event Study
The event study methodology is used in this thesis. Its main components will be carefully
elaborated later on in Section 4, but a short introduction is provided here. In this thesis,
event study methodology is is applied to analyse whether an event causes abnormal stock
returns. Figure 1.1 illustrates the main components of an event study.
An event happens on a specific date T0. To capture variation in stock prices related to
the event, an event window is defined, which at a minimum contains the date of the event.
Detecting abnormal returns requires a benchmark for normal returns, and the choice of
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benchmark model varies in event study methodology. Normal returns are, however, usually
estimated using estimation window observations. The estimation window is defined as
a period prior to the specific event window, and the estimation window may vary in
duration.
In economic terms, the event study is conducted to examine if an event causes returns
which are more extreme than normal. Normal returns are estimated in the estimation
window, before they are compared to actual returns in the event window. Deviations
between actual returns and normal returns are defined as abnormal.
To detect whether abnormal returns are significantly different from zero, it is usual to
apply one or more statistical tests. The structure of tests vary, which means that different
tests have different features.
Figure 1.1: Event Study Timeline
Figure 1.1 displays main components of an event study. T0 refers to the event date. The event window
refers to the time period surrounding the event date, where T-1 is the lower limit, and T1 the upper limit.
The estimation window refers to a defined period before the event window, where T-2. is the lower limit,
and T-3 the upper limit.
1.2.1 Event Definition and Grouping
An event, which falls on an event date, is defined as the announcement of the ESG Score.
Whereas Thomson Reuters provides a new score for each announcement, we choose to
examine change from the previous score. As the score is usually announced once a year
on the same date as the previous year, the events of interest become year-on-year change.
Events are organized in three groups. A distinction is made between a positive event, a
neutral event, and a negative event, which all are related to the year-on-year change in
ESG Score. The distinction is made in relative terms, meaning a positive event is defined
as the upper quartile (inclusive) of total events, whereas a negative event is defined as the
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lower quartile (inclusive) of total events. A neutral event is naturally defined as the middle
ground. Therefore, positive events are defined as an ESG Score year-on-year change of
more than 10.61 percent. Negative events are defined as a year-on-year change of less
than -2.77 percent. Neutral events are defined as a year-on-year change less than 10.61
percent and more than -2.77 percent.
Grouping is done to examine the whole data set without assuming linearity, as we not
expect it to be a linear relationship between the ESG Score and abnormal returns.
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2 Literature Review
Findings on the relationship between ESG and the financial performance of firms are
divided. The topic has been approached with different methodologies, but resulting in
inconsistent results. Some findings show to a positive relationship (Capelle-Blancard
and Petit (2017), Brogi and Lagasio (2019)), some negative (Krüger, 2015), while others
find no relationship between ESG initiatives and financial performance (Alexander and
Buchholz, 1978). This literature review provides an overview of research relevant to our
research questions, presented in Section 3.
Historically, research related to ESG initiatives has primary focused on the environmental
aspect, such as Bragdon and Marlin (1972). More recent research has also studied social
responsibility and governance, meaning the full aspect of the ESG term. For example,
Capelle-Blancard and Petit (2017) investigated whether ESG related news affect stock
prices.
2.1 Early Stages
Bragdon and Marlin (1972) is an early study on the relationship between environmental
performance and firms’ financial performance. They investigated whether the profitability
of a firm is related to its air and water pollution. A common belief was that firms
had to choose between “doing good” and being profitable, where doing good was being
environment-friendly. Bragdon and Marlin investigated 17 pulp and paper production
firms in the United States from 1965 to 1970, and found a positive relationship between
profitability and low pollution – an indication that firms do not need to decide between
being profitable and taking care of the environment. An explanation for the relationship
was that pollution control reduced labour costs, by reducing health insurance premiums.
At the time, pollution caused severe long-term health problems for employees. Additionally,
recycling paper contributed to lowering the raw material costs.
A reason for early beliefs of a trade-off between profits and environmental initiatives, was
that environmental initiatives were affiliated with higher costs. This claim was made
by Vance (1975), but later shelved by Alexander and Buchholz (1978). Alexander and
Buchholz investigated whether social responsibility had a positive effect on stock prices,
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and social responsibility was measured by surveys. The study is based on 40 firms from
1970 to 1974, and results showed no statistical significant relationship between social
responsibility and stock returns. They therefore concluded on stock markets to be efficient
as described by Fama (1970), which indicates that the value effect of responsible action
was already reflected in the stock price. An additional explanation of their findings was
that investors were indifferent to firms’ approach to social responsibility.
2.2 Announcements
This thesis examines the announcement of ESG Scores. Previous research related to the
effect of ESG announcements on stock prices are therefore highly relevant.
Laplante and Lanoie (1994) used event study methodology to analyse how stock prices
of 47 Canadian firms reacted to ESG related news. They found no abnormal returns
the day after negative environmental incidents were announced, but abnormal returns of
-1.2 percent were found the day after a firm announced it would invest in anti-pollution
equipment. The latter finding is similar to that of Vance (1975), and indicates that
investors believe costs of environmental improvements exceeds expected benefits.
Krüger (2015) used event study methodology to examine the short-term stock price
reactions of negative environmental and social news. He found that the news
announcements are followed by a short-term decrease in stock price. The study is based
on 745 firms from 2001 to 2007. Krüger obtained data from the leading database on ESG
information for firms in the United States, which now corresponds to MSCI3. Additionally,
Krüger shows that a abnormal negative price reaction is present when improvements of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) are announced. The latter is similar to the findings
of Vance (1975) and Laplante and Lanoie (1994), and indicates that investors find CSR
initiatives to be costly, and to exceed expected future benefits. However, governance
related news were not accounted for in Kruger’s study, due to the doubts of measurement
techniques used. The study by does therefore only account for reactions to news related
to the environment and social responsibility.
Capelle-Blancard and Petit (2017) used event study methodology to examine short-
term stock price reactions to more than 30000 positive and negative ESG related
3MSCI is an abbreviation for Morgan Stanley Capital International.
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announcements, provided by the Covalence Ethical Quote database. Examples of positive
news announcements were winning green awards or launches of environmental friendly
products, whereas negative news among others included news about downsizing, toxic
release, and bad labour environment. The study is based on 100 public firms included
in the Dow Jones Titans index from 2002 to 2010. They found negative abnormal stock
price reactions of -0.1 percent after the publication of negative ESG relative news. In
terms of the stock price reactions to positive ESG news, the findings of Capelle-Blancard
and Petit indicate no relationship.
Brogi and Lagasio (2019) examined the relationship between long-term financial
performance of firms and their ESG initiatives. ESG initiatives conducted by each
firm were measured by a binary ESG scoring model provided by MSCI4, whereas financial
performance was measured by the firm’s return on assets5. Brogi and Lagasio analysed
more than 17000 observations on 3476 firms in the United States from 2000 to 2016,
and their findings indicate a positive relationship between ESG initiatives and ROA,
concluding on ESG initiatives to create value for firm stakeholders. In addition, they
find differences across sectors. Banks are in particular profiting financially (higher ROA)
from focusing on ESG initiatives, compared to other firms. The researchers explain this
relationship by United States banks’ long focus on lowering their environmental footprint.
Elayan et al. (2014) investigated whether stock prices are affected by ethical performance.
The study is based on data from 541 multi-national firms from 2006 to 2009. Ethical
performance was measured on quarterly updates from the Covalence Ethical Quote index.
Their findings show positive abnormal stock price reactions to ethical upgrades and
negative abnormal stock price reactions to ethical downgrades. This indicates that the
Covalence Ethical Quote ranking represents new information to investors. Contrary to the
findings of Krüger (2015) and Laplante and Lanoie (1994), findings indicate that investors
interpret expected benefit of ESG initiatives to exceed expected costs. Another interesting
finding is an asymmetric stock price reaction to up- and downgrades. The magnitude of
abnormal returns following ethical upgrades were less than the magnitude of abnormal
returns following ethical downgrades. This finding indicates that investors seem to punish
ethical downgrades more than rewarding upgrades.
4The scoring model is based on the MSCI ESG KLD STATS database.
5Return on assets (ROA) was calculated as net income divided by total assets.
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Elayan et.al. also investigated whether firm characteristics are associated with positive or
negative stock price reactions. The results show that financially well-performing firms
are associated with positive price reactions following an Ethical Score upgrade. Financial
performance was measured by a metric developed by the researchers6.
As stated initially in the literature review, a clear consensus on how ESG related news
affect stock prices does not exist. Event study methodology has been widely used, for
example by Laplante and Lanoie (1994), Elayan et al. (2014), and Krüger (2015). Another
popular approach not mentioned above is index inclusion and exclusion (Cheung (2011),
Oberndorfer et al. (2011)). Similar to ESG announcements, mentioned research on index
inclusion and exclusion do not provide any clear consensus in terms stock price reactions
to ESG news.
6The metric consists of 13 different financial metrics, such as return on assets, return on equity, and
earnings per share. See Elayan et al. (2014) page 389 for a more detailed description.
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3 Research Questions and Hypotheses
In this section, we define research questions and hypotheses. Primarily, event
study methodology is applied to investigate stock price reactions around ESG Score
announcements. In addition, we investigate the correlation of firm characteristics with
stock price reactions around names announcements.
3.1 Research Questions
Evaluation is performed by examining two research questions, which aim to examine
whether the ESG Scores provide new information to investors, and the correlation of
firm characteristics with stock price reactions. Plantinga et al. (2015) find that due to
time and resource restrictions, an investor will not be able to process all the available
information on ESG initiatives, and will therefore rely on ESG scores provided by ESG
rating agencies. As a result, an argument can be made that ESG Scores are an important
metric for investment decisions.
Our main research question is defined by:
Research Question 1. Do announcements of the ESG Score contain new information
for investors?
In addition to the main research question, we will examine characteristics of firms which
experiences positive and negative stock price reactions around events. More specifically,
we seek to examine whether there are firm characteristics which increases the likelihood
of a firm experiencing a positive or negative stock price reaction. The second research
question is defined as:
Research Question 2. Do price reactions to ESG announcements correlate with firm
characteristics?
3.2 Hypotheses
In order to investigate our research questions, we define four hypotheses and what we
expect to find.
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Hypothesis 1. Announcements of positive events are associated with abnormal stock
price reactions.
We hypothesise that the ESG Score announcements represents new information to investors.
Therefore, we expect abnormal price reactions as investors react to the announcements.
As discussed in the literature review in Section 2, existing literature is divided in terms of
the direction of stock price reactions to ESG initiatives. Hence, we do not hypothesise
the direction of abnormal stock price reactions to positive events, only that there will be
abnormal stock price reactions.
Hypothesis 2. Announcements of negative events are associated with abnormal stock
price reactions.
On the same note as Hypothesis 1, we hypothesise that there are abnormal price reactions
around negative events. Once again, the hypothesis is that there will be abnormal price
reactions, and no specific direction is predicted. This notion is based on existing literature,
already presented in Section 2.
Hypothesis 3. Announcements of neutral events are not associated with abnormal stock
price reactions.
We hypothesise that there are abnormal price reactions around positive and negative
events, and that there are no abnormal price reactions around neutral events.
Therefore, we primarily aim to examine positive and negative events. Neutral events are
best viewed as a control group, where no abnormal price reactions are expected.
Hypothesis 4. Certain firm characteristics are correlated with positive and/or negative
stock price reactions.
We hypothesise that there are certain firm characteristics which are correlated with the
likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions, given a positive or negative event. It is
expected as we believe firm characteristics affects how firms are positioned to capitalize
on ESG initiatives, or lack of ESG initiatives.
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4 Theoretical Framework
Initially, early work within event study methodology is presented in this section.
Furthermore, most main components of an event study, which were already introduced in
Section 1.2, are elaborated on. The components are applied to provide a framework for
answering Research Question 1 and hypotheses as defined in Section 3.
Event studies have been a popular tool to examine events for publicly listed firms for
decades. The intuition behind event studies may be seen in relation to the efficient market
hypothesis (Fama, 1970), which in its strong form states that stock prices reflect all
available information. If the efficient market hypothesis holds, then stock prices should
only react to new information. If markets are semi-strong, stock prices should reflect new
information quickly, which usually is the basis for event studies.
Ball and Brown (1968) examined the effect of accounting earnings announcements on
stock prices. They based their analysis on earnings data in the United States from 1946
to 1966, as announced by the Wall Street Journal. As they found no abnormal price
reactions, they concluded on earnings information already being incorporated in stock
prices.
4.1 Estimation Window
An important component in event study methodology is the estimation window7. As
introduced, its purpose is to estimate normal returns for observations in the event window.
The estimation window length is chosen balancing increased precision (longer window)
with including as little unrelated movements as possible (shorter window). A popular
choice in literature is an estimation window ranging from 250 days before the event to
30 days before the event, but there is no set length for estimation windows (Aktas et al.,
2007).
Setting an appropriate length for the estimation window is important to obtain valid
results. Poor choice of estimation window could cause biased normal returns. However,
the estimation window has, somewhat surprisingly, historically attracted less interest in
7Illustrated in Section 1.2.
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event study methodology (Aktas et al., 2007).
The estimation window should not include variation tied to the event window, which is the
reason researchers set the estimation window to end before the event window (MacKinlay,
1997). Also, Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) states that the estimation
window of an event study should not include the event window, as it would cause biased
normal returns. To understand this bias, consider again the purpose of an estimation
window. Its purpose is to estimate normal returns, which in turn are used to detect
whether an event induces abnormal returns. Including event-specific variation in the
estimation window would violate the separation of normal and abnormal returns, and
thus cause biased normal returns.
Another bias which could be present in the estimation window is in the form of including
unrelated stock movements. The intuition is that including observations which are
not relevant would interact with standard errors of normal returns, for example by
overestimating standard errors if unrelated movements included deviates heavily from the
mean of estimation window returns. Overestimating standard errors would cause a type 2
error when testing for abnormal returns, meaning a false negative. A false negative occurs
when the null hypothesis is kept when it, in reality, should be rejected. As standard errors
usually are in the denominator for in test statistics for abnormal returns, overstating them
understates the test statistic, leading to type 2 errors.
A solution to this problem is to manually exclude unrelated movements from the estimation
window, which proves laborious for medium to large samples. Another option is to test
for abnormal returns using a test which aims to exclude unrelated movements in the
estimation window, such as the test of Aktas et al. (2007). A third option is to use
Winsorizing8, a technique where the magnitude of extreme outliers are reduced.
Although sounding promising, trying to exclude unrelated stock movements might actually
hurt more than it improves in terms of event study specification. The reason is that it is
hard to determine what is related stock price movements in the estimation window and
what is not. Attempting to single out unrelated stock price movements could therefore
cause unexpected biases, so neither of the three mentioned options for eliminating unrelated
stock price movements in the estimation window are applied in this thesis.
8Named after Charles P. Winsor.
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We set the estimation window length to [-200, -10]9, meaning it starts (inclusive) 200 days
before the ESG Score announcement and ends (inclusive) 10 days before the ESG Score
announcement.
4.2 Event Window
Defining the event window is another important step to conduct an event study. MacKinlay
(1997) states that the event window often includes at least the event day and the following
day. Event windows could be expanded to include days prior to the event day if information
leakage is suspected (MacKinlay, 1997), and more days after the event day if it is necessary
to capture post-event day returns related to the event. The intuition behind setting the
event window length is to include all event specific information while excluding information
not related to the event. In practice, that is hard to do, as there is no such thing as “one
effect present” in the stock market. The stock market is complex and continually affected
by many effects, which makes an assumption that the event is the only factor which affects
stock prices at a specific time point weak. The solution is a trade-off, where extending
the event window length leads to capturing more information, both event specific and
non-related information.
Setting the event window length, thus includes a question of how fast the market reacts
to new information. If the market is semi-efficient according to Fama (1970), this period
should be short for there to be no arbitrage opportunities. However, the duration of
market imbalance following the news, which is defined by Krivin et al. (2003) as the
duration where future stock movements are affected by past news, has been studied ever
since Fama (1970). Research on the topic includes Hillmer and Yu (1979) and Chordia
et al. (2005), who finds that the market imbalance period lasts for a matter of hours or
minutes, respectively, thus making a case for the use of a single-day event window. Krivin
et al. (2003) states that the imbalance period is useful to set a minimum duration of the
event window, but it does not necessarily define the proper length.
Lev (1989) examines 19 event studies conducted and published in four major accounting
9Ideally, a thorough analysis should be conducted for stock markets in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and
Denmark to determine the optimal estimation window duration for events over our time span, but it is
laborious and assumed to be of minimal interest for the reader. Therefore, the estimation window is set
somewhat arbitrary, but within the usual limits in event study literature.
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journals in the 1980s where the vast majority use fixed event windows (same for all events
in the study), with lengths ranging from two days to a year. A popular choice of event
window length in more recent literature has been a three-day event window (Campbell
et al. (2010); Capelle-Blancard and Petit (2017)), or multiple days before and after the
event (Krüger (2015); Elayan et al. (2014)).
The choice of event window length determines a distinction in event study literature. The
distinction between short-term event studies and long-term event studies is not set in
stone, but is usually done around the one year mark ((Kothari and Warner, 2007)). Hence,
a long-term event study examines stock prices for a duration of at least a year around
the event, while a short-term event study examines stock prices over a shorter time span,
often just a couple of days. While Fama et al. (1969) is a long-term event study, more
recent literature generally leans on short-term event studies. Short term event studies
are considered to provide clear evidence when specified correctly (Fama, 1991), while
the interpretation of long-term event studies are more problematic (Kothari and Warner,
2007). Fama (1998) finds that long run anomalies cannot be replicated using a variety of
statistical approaches, and they are therefore found by chance. Kothari and Warner (1997)
find that inferences in long-horizon studies are not reliable, while Lyon et al. (1999) finds
that long-horizon studies are sensitive to non-random sampling. Literature generally find
results of short-horizon tests more dependable than those of long-horizon tests (Brown
and Warner (1980); Kothari and Warner (2007))
If investors, in line with the findings of Plantinga et al. (2015), use the ESG Score to
interpret complex information, they would be interested in acquiring the information
before other investors. Hence, abnormal returns due to leaked information might be
present in our study.
ESG Score announcements differ from other typical firm announcements examined in event
studies such as earnings announcements. ESG Scores do not represent insider information
and are not subject to strict regulations in terms of notifying all stakeholders at the same
time. Therefore, it is possible that ESG Scores are treated less carefully, and information
is more likely to be leaked.
For robustness purposes, we define ten different event windows in our study. Three event
windows are defined to capture abnormal returns due to leaked information, namely event
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windows [-5,0], [-3,0], and [-1,0]. Furthermore, four event windows are defined to capture
effects after the ESG Score announcement. The four event windows are [0,1], [0,3], [0,5],
and [0,10]. Three additional event windows are defined to capture effects on both sides
of the ESG Score announcement, namely event windows [-5,5], [-3,3], and [-1,1]. Event
window duration ranges from 2 days to 11 days, and days are defined as trading days,
meaning days where the respective stock exchange is open. The event day is either the
day of the ESG Score announcement or the first trading day after.
Note that all event windows are kept short to avoid the problems of long-horizon event
studies, but all event windows are over multiple days to capture effects of the announcement
around the event day.
4.3 Benchmark Return Model
The estimation of normal returns, illustrated in Section 1.2, requires a benchmark return
model. Quite a few different models have been applied in event study literature. Statistical
methods include the constant mean model and the single-factor market model, while
economic models include the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama-French
factor models and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) model.
The single-factor market model is chosen to estimate normal returns in this thesis. The
market model is chosen as other, often more complicated, models do not outperform the
market model (Brown and Warner (1980); Binder (1998)). A clear benefit of the market
model compared to other statistical models such as the constant mean model, is that the
market model incorporates each stock’s sensitivity to the market return. It follows that
the market model is more robust compared to the constant mean model in a case where
cross-correlation10 is present. Another feature of the market model, compared to economic
models, is that it relies on statistical assumptions, and is not restricted by assumptions
related to investor behaviour.
The market model is defined as (MacKinlay, 1997):
Rit = ↵i +  iRmt + ✏it, (4.1)
10Cross-correlation is elaborated on in Section 6.1.
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E(✏it) = 0, V ar(✏it) =  
2
✏ , (4.2)
where Rit is the calculated normal return for security i at time t and Rmt is the market
return at time t. ↵i and  i are regression parameters and are estimated using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression.  i is each stock’s sensitivity to the market index. The
regression parameters are estimated over the estimation window.
The residual ✏it is an estimator of abnormal returns, and the regression method seeks
to isolate firm specific information in the error term (Fama et al., 1969). Calculated
abnormal returns, as illustrated in Equation 4.2, will be jointly normally distributed with
a zero conditional mean and conditional variance (MacKinlay, 1997).
Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between actual returns for security i and
the estimated normal returns for security i. Abnormal returns are calculated for each day
in the event window, and given by:
ARit = Rit  Rmt, (4.3)
where Rit is the actual return for security i at time t, and Rmt is the estimated normal
return for security m at time t. Combining the linear equation for normal return and the
equation for abnormal return gives:
ARit = Rit   ↵̂i    ̂iRmt. (4.4)
In order to calculate reliable normal returns, regression parameters need to be unbiased.
Unbiased estimators are achieved when the general assumptions for OLS hold. MacKinlay
(1997) argues that it is reasonable to believe that the assumptions hold and rarely lead to
any problems. Assumptions are formally checked for the Nordic markets, and they seem
reasonable also in this case. Results from a thorough approach is available to the reader
in Appendix A1.
To test whether ESG Score changes have an overall effect on stock price reactions, abnormal
returns are aggregated across time and securities. Aggregation has two major advantages.
One is that aggregation across securities is useful as it is easier to separate a general
score effect from firm specific effects. Furthermore, aggregation across securities offsets
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potential problems related to market misinterpretation of a few individual firms, as the
average reaction to an event is measured for a diverse group of firms. Advantage two is
that event dates spread across time reduces correlation between events, as well as reduces
the problem of systematic errors.
Firstly, abnormal returns are aggregated per event window for each event by defining





where ARit are abnormal returns for security i at time t in the event window and L the
upper limit for t defined by the size of the event window.
The last step before testing for statistical significance is to account for the number of






where N is the number of examined events.
4.4 Estimating Market Return
While early studies such as (Fama et al., 1969) focused on a single market, more recent
event studies also examine several markets. In this thesis, stock price reactions to ESG
Score announcements are examined for Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland, thus
making this a multi-country event study. In such event studies, there are likely to be
different individual effects for each country. Examples of individual effects that can vary
between countries include interest rates, regulations, and currency effects.
In general, the market model specifies that the return of a security depends on its beta11
multiplied by the market return. A proxy is applied to estimate market return, which
is usually defined as the market portfolio. The market portfolio is defined as a bundle
of assets which provides the same expected return as the market. A potential proxy is
a value-weighted index, which weights each asset equal to its size in the market. Value-
11Defined in Equation 4.1.
18 4.4 Estimating Market Return
weighted indices are frequently used in event study literature, and applied by for example
Brown and Warner (1985) and Campbell et al. (2010) to represent the market portfolio
and thus market return.
However, the market portfolio is based on the notion that it replicates market return. A
value-weighted index for the whole market might therefore be imprecise if ESG Scores are
not applied to all firms in the market. This depends on the definition of the market. For
example, if the researcher defines the Norwegian market as shares noted on Oslo Børs,
a value-weighted index for Oslo Børs would present an excellent option for the market
portfolio. On the other hand, if Euronext Expand and Euronext Growth are also included
in the definition of the market, an index based solely on Oslo Børs would be less precise.
The findings of Campbell et al. (2010) support this argument. They find that a single-
market model with national market index works well as a proxy for the market return in
multi-country event studies. For this reason, national indices are applied in our benchmark
model, the market model presented in Equation 4.1.
Another potential proxy for the market portfolio would be to construct national value-
weighted indices for firms assigned an ESG Score, but it falls outside of the scope of
this thesis. Instead, we aim to identify the best proxy - which makes value-weighted
indices generally attractive. However, two characteristics in the data set stands out12: (i)
ESG Scores are mainly assigned to large-cap firms, and (ii) some countries have a high
representation of a specific industry.
To identify the best proxy for market return for each country, i.e. the market portfolio,
several indices based on market capitalisation and industry are tested. As these results
are not the main focus of this thesis, results are presented in Table A1.2 in Appendix A1.
Some indices present results similar to that of the value-weighted index for each country,
but no indices stand out in that regard. In line with Brown and Warner (1985) and
Campbell et al. (2010), national value-weighted indices are therefore applied as proxies
for the market portfolio.
12Firm characteristics are described in Section 5.2. Here, we are content with two main features.
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5 Data
This section presents the data used in this thesis. Firstly, the collection and cleaning
process are briefly explained in Section 5.1, before descriptive statistics are presented in
Section 5.2.
5.1 Data Collection
ESG Scores for public firms in the Nordic from 2010 to 2020 were retrieved from the
Thomson Reuters Refinitiv database. Firms were required to have a minimum of two
subsequent ESG Score observations in this time span, as ESG Score changes relative to the
previous year are of interest in this thesis. The data set for the event study thus consists
of 1278 unique events and 309 unique firms. Additionally, data on firm characteristics
were retrieved from the same database.
The data set used to examine firm characteristics consists of 612 events and 219 unique
firms. Note that it is based on the same data as the event study, but the correlation
between firm characteristics and stock price reactions are only examined for positive
and negative events. Hence, there are fewer observations. Moreover, a few events were
excluded as data on firm characteristics for these firms was not available.
Daily adjusted stock prices13 for firms were also retrieved. Stock prices for firms listed
after 2010 were retrieved from their first trading day. Although early studies, such as
Fama et al. (1969), used monthly return data, daily data is used by default in modern
event studies. Daily data increases precision compared to monthly data, and Brown
and Warner (1985) found that daily data generally do not hurt the specification of event
studies.
Index data for calculation of market returns for firms listed in Sweden, Denmark, and
Finland was retrieved directly from Nasdaq. For firms listed in Norway, index data was
retrieved from Oslo Børs.
To calculate stock and market returns, both simple returns and the natural logarithm
of returns may be used. Wooldridge (2013) finds the difference between simple and
13Daily adjusted stock prices are stock prices adjusted for dividends, share splits, and other incidents.
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logarithmic returns to be very small when results are hovering around zero, which is
generally the case for our data set.
The difference of simple and logarithmic returns are examined, and differences are, as
Wooldridge (2013) predicts, minor. Figure A2.1 in Appendix A2 substantiates this. Simple
returns are used in this thesis.








Events are segmented by market capitalisation and industry, based on the firm which has
the event. Events are segmented by market capitalisation into small-cap, mid-cap and
large-cap events. The segmentation is based on guidelines provided by Nasdaq Nordic
(2019) and Oslo Børs (2020). Nasdaq guidelines are applied to the Swedish, Finnish,
and Danish markets, while Oslo Børs guidelines are applied to the Norwegian market.
Guidelines are presented in Figure A2.1 in Appendix A2.
Descriptive statistics for total events are summarized in Table 5.1. Industry segmentation
follows Thomson Reuters standards, which are presented in Table A2.4 in Appendix A2.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Firm Statistics by Observed ESG Score Changes.
Norway Sweden Finland Denmark Total
Total events 239 560 225 254 1278
Positive 68 137 50 61 316
Negative 61 142 52 67 322
Neutral 110 281 123 126 640
Market capitalization
Small-Cap 21 14 1 9 45
Mid-Cap 86 71 24 51 232
Large-Cap 132 475 200 194 1001
Industry segmentation
Financials 35 85 9 46 175
Energy 96 9 9 9 123
Industrials 24 164 78 82 348
Healthcare 1 36 17 60 114
Materials 21 51 45 18 135
Utilities 1 0 9 4 14
Technology 30 70 32 4 136
CC 25 28 15 12 80
CNS 4 68 10 19 101
Real Estate 2 49 1 0 52
Table 5.1 summarises descriptive statistics of observed ESG rating changes (events) from 2011 to 2020.
Firms are traded at the Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and Finish stock exchange. Events are categorized in
three groups: Positive, negative, and neutral. Positive events are identified with an ESG score year-on-year
change of more than 10.61%. Negative events are identified with y/y change of -2.77%. Neutral events are
identified as y/y change lower than 10.61% and higher than -2.77%. Market capitalisation segmentation
is done by applying stock exchange standards (See Table A2.1 in Appendix A2 for a more detailed
description). Industry segmentation follows Thomson Reuters standards (See Table A2.4 in Appendix A2
for a more detailed description). CS = Consumer Cyclicals, CNS = Consumer Non-Cyclicals.
Table 5.1 summarises descriptive statistics for positive, negative, and neutral events. The
table presents a total of 1278 events, where 316 are categorized as positive, 322 negative,
and 640 as neutral. A few events from the original grouping14 are removed as their stock
returns were not available.
Sweden has the most events in the data set, which is sensible given that Nasdaq Stockholm
is the largest stock exchange in the Nordic. Sweden has a total of 560 ESG score
announcements with 137 positive, 142 negative, and 281 neutral events. In other words,
the representation is almost symmetrical across event groups. Norway, Finland, and
14See grouping definition in Section 1.2.
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Denmark are about equally represented for total events as well as for each event group.
ESG Scores in Norway appears to be a bit more volatile than its Danish and Finnish
counterparts, as fewer events are categorized as neutral.
Furthermore, large-cap firms are more represented than mid-cap and small-cap firms
in the data set. It applies to all four markets, but Finland stands out with 200 of 225
events. In terms of industry description, Industrials is the most represented industry with
a total of 348 events. Additionally, Financials and Materials also stand out in terms of
representation with 175 and 135 events, respectively. Sweden is clearly dominated by the
Industrials industry (164 out of 560), while Norway has a larger share of events for firms
in the Energy industry (96 out of 239) compared to the other countries. Finland and
Denmark are more evenly-distributed across industries.
The overall impression is an overweight of events from Sweden, and an overweight of
large-cap firms.
Table 5.2 is provided to illustrate how events are spread out across time. Note that the
base is quite stable for all countries except Sweden in the time period 2011 from 2020,
which means that number of events are somewhat stable until 2020. The year 2019 has
the most events with a total of 253, which is an increase of 141 events compared to the
observations in 2011. 2019 also has the steepest increase from the previous year in number
of observations (up to 250 from 159 events in 2018).
Table 5.2: Number of Observed Events by Year.
Year Norway Sweden Finland Denmark Total
2011 21 44 22 25 112
2012 21 46 23 25 115
2013 21 48 23 25 117
2014 22 49 24 25 120
2015 22 52 24 26 124
2016 23 61 24 27 135
2017 23 68 24 28 143
2018 28 74 26 31 159
2019 58 116 35 41 250
2020 0 2 0 1 3
Table 5.2 summarises number of total events by year for each country. An event is defined as the
announcement of ESG Score.
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6 Defining Tests for Abnormal Returns
Most main components of an event study were elaborated on in Section 4. This section
will discuss the remaining main component, more specifically the statistical tests used to
examine whether abnormal returns are present or not. This section also provides insight
to potential problems in the data set, which is used to define a test battery.
6.1 Dependency Problems
In the data set used in this event study, ESG Scores are announced for many firms on the
same day. It causes what in event study methodology is called event date clustering. As
a result, cross-sectional correlation is present, which is a potential problem (Kolari and
Pynnönen, 2010). Salinger (1992) finds that ignoring cross-sectional correlation can lead
to seriously underestimated standard errors, while Kolari and Pynnönen find that even
low cross-correlation hurts test specification in terms of increasing type 1 errors.
A type 1 error in statistics is a false positive, meaning the null hypothesis is rejected when
there is not enough evidence to reject it. To illustrate ways cross-correlation could lead to
type 1 errors, consider the situation of event date clustering. In the days surrounding the
clustered event day, firms are affected by many co-founding effects. An example could
be that the national government just issued a stimulus package for all firms. Thus, if all
firms benefit from the stimulus package, one would expect their stock prices to correlate
upwards. If this effect is present in the estimation window, normal return calculations
would be biased. Similarly, if this effect is present in the event window, returns could
appear abnormal due to the stimulus package. Usually, such effects are inevitable in
event studies, but event date clustering makes them problematic. Intuition is that in the
presence of event date clustering, the mentioned effect would affect many firms, contrary
to only one (or a few) firms if event date clustering is not present. Hence, test results are
likely to be biased in the presence of event data clustering, if it is not accounted for.
The main insight for dealing with clustered events, is that returns across securities tend to
correlate. The intuition applies for both the event window and the estimation window. If
test statistics do not account for this phenomena, standard errors are underestimated by
assuming zero cross-sectional correlation for returns. As standard errors usually are found
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in the denominator of test statistics, the understatement leads to a lesser-than-actual
value in the denominator. As a consequence, the test statistic is overestimated, leading to
false rejections of the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns - type 1 errors.
The problem of classic statistical tests for abnormal returns is that they assume
independence in the error term of observations, meaning no cross-correlation. Kolari
and Pynnönen (2010) survey all event studies from 1980 to 2007 in four major financial
journals, and accounts for their way of coping with cross-correlation. As much as 55 (of
76) used the portfolio method proposed by Jaffe (1974), which aggregates a portfolio of
equally weighted securities, to cope with cross-correlation issues. Another solution is to
apply a test statistic which is robust to cross-correlation, which is chosen for this thesis.
Event date clustering in the data set is illustrated in Table 6.1. For example, a major
portion of events occur on the 31st of December, meaning the first trading day after the
event is the first trading day of a new year15.
Table 6.1: Clustering of ESG Scores.
Dates with 1 event Dates with 2-5 events Dates with > 100 events
45 15 9
Table 6.1 illustrates the level of clustering for event dates in the time period 2011 to 2020.
45 dates contains only one event, 15 dates contains 2-5 events, and 9 dates contains more
than 100 events.
Country-clustering is another type of clustering effect which could lead to biased results
when drawing conclusions for the whole population. As seen from the descriptive statistics
presented in Table 5.1, firms traded on the Swedish stock exchange stand out with 560
total events. This indicates a share of almost 50 percent of total observations. One could
therefore argue that observations for Sweden are over-represented in our sample. However,
Nordic countries are known for their similar governance structure. For example, Sinani
et al. (2008) finds that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are homogeneous in terms of
political stability, control of corruption, and accountability. It is therefore reasonable
to believe that investors invested in the Nordic market respond similar to ESG related
publications. Hence, we argue that the relatively high share of Swedish observations is
15Unusual (relatively to the rest of the year) trading patterns around the turn of the year is well-known
in finance. For example, related to the phenomena that investors sell stocks at the end of the year for tax
(shield) purposes.
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not a problem when drawing conclusions for the whole population.
6.2 Event Induced Variance
A reason why the common portfolio method by Jaffe (1974) is not applied in this thesis,
is that it is inefficient and not robust in the case of event induced variance (Kolari and
Pynnönen, 2010).
Event induced variance is present when the variance of returns increases around the event
date. This increase occurs when firms react differently to the new information presented in
the event (Boehmer et al., 1991), and event induced variance is especially applicable when
operating with daily returns (Brown and Warner, 1985). Ignoring the effect of induced
variance typically leads to type 1 errors. Event induced variance becomes a problem when
applying statistical tests to detect abnormal returns, as a bias occurs in the comparison
of normal and actual returns. Induced variance in the event window causes estimation
window observations, which is used to calculate normal returns, to have understated
variance relatively to event window returns. Therefore, event window observations appear
more extreme than they are in reality, and type 1 errors occur.
ESG Score announcements, and therefore yearly change of ESG Score, may differ
substantially in terms of magnitude of year-on-year change. However, even for an identical
year-on-year change, there is reason to believe that firms are affected differently. This
follows the fact that investor preferences are differentiated, both for individual stocks
and across industries. One might for example suspect that a firm in a sector focused on
sustainability will have a different stock market reaction to a notable upgrade in a firm’s
ESG Score, compared to a notable upgrade for a firm in another sector. Furthermore,
investors might be more reluctant to invest in a low-scoring FMCG16 firm than a low-
scoring oil firm, if investors are more concerned of the sustainability of the latter than the
former.
Event-induced stock price movements are the whole basis of an event study, as the
methodology is based on how large abnormal returns are needed to detect statistically
significant abnormal returns. Harrington and Shrider (2007) found that all events induce
variance, making it a potential problem which is accounted for in this thesis by using
16Fast-Moving Consumer Goods
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robust tests.
Harrington and Schrider found that increased variance in the event window causes
heteroscedasticity in cross-sectional regressions, and thus causing biased estimators for
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. A fairly standard solution applied by researchers
to cope with heteroscedasticity is to use robust standard errors17.
In this thesis, robust standard errors are not applied. Instead, tests which are robust for
event induced variance are used, meaning the test developers have applied robustness
methods themselves. Using tests which are robust for event induced variance is consistent
with the recommendations of Harrington and Shrider (2007). Also, Kolari and Pynnönen
(2010) found that the choice of test statistic is important to avoid type 1 errors as caused
by event induced variance.
6.3 Skewness and Kurtosis
Skewness and kurtosis are phenomenons which could affect the proper choice of statistical
significance tests, as it affects the data distribution. If skewness and kurtosis are present,
a test which does not assume a specific distribution would be more appealing. Skewness
refers to lack of symmetry in the data, while kurtosis is present if data are heavy-tailed or
heavy-peaked, meaning there are either many extreme observations or an extreme amount
of similar observations18. Keep in mind the structure of an event study, defined in Section
1.2. Estimation window observations are used to construct normal returns, before event
window observations are tested in relation to normal returns19. Returns in the event
windows do not appear to suffer from skewness, but kurtosis might be present as events
are heavily peaked. It is illustrated in Figure A2.1 in Appendix A2.
17Robust standard errors could be applied by several methods, for example White’s standard errors or
Hubard-White standard errors.
18Heavy-tailed refers to the two ends of the data distribution, and heavy-peaked refers to the highest
point of the data distribution. For example, the Laplace distribution is a heavy-peaked distribution, while
the Cauchy distribution is a heavy-tailed distribution.
19Assumptions for normal return estimation are discussed in Section 4.3. Subsequently, this paragraph
refers to skewness and kurtosis in the event window.
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6.4 Test Battery
In this section, we define a test battery for our empirical analysis. Moreover, this
section concerns aspects of statistical significance tests in event studies. In general, cross-
correlation and event induced variance needs to be accounted for, as discussed in Section
6.1 and 6.2.
As mentioned in Section 1.2, a statistical significance test is used to detect whether
abnormal returns are different from zero. There are two main groups of tests, parametric
and non-parametric tests. Parametric tests requires the data to follow a particular
distribution, whereas a non-parametric test may be viewed as distribution-free tests.
Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) states that non-parametric tests are preferable to parametric
tests in event study methodology, as stock returns do not follow a specific distribution.
The drawback is that a non-parametric test might be less powerful than a parametric
test when the data distribution requirement is met, meaning type 2 errors probability is
increased.
Following our check for normality for positive, negative, and neutral events for the
event window [-3,3], it is sensible to assume that the data follows the Gaussian normal
distribution. A parametric test may therefore make sense to use. However, we are testing
for several event windows, and also have potential problems in the form of event induced
variance, cross-correlation and kurtosis.
As a consequence, we define a test battery consisting of a parametric and a non-parametric
test. The battery is modelled by two tests which both are sensible choices given our data
set, to ensure robustness in our analysis.
Applying several tests is consistent with the findings of (Campbell et al., 2010), who test
the performance of event study methodology in 54 different countries from 1986 to 2006.
If test results differ, interpretation should be conducted with caution.
Popular parametric tests include the original BMP test (Boehmer et al., 1991) and Patell
test (Patell, 1976). Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) found the original BMP test creating far
less type 1 errors compared to the commonly used Patell test when induced variance was
present.
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Kolari and Pynnönen presented an adjustment of the BMP test, which performs well in
the presence of cross-correlation and event-induced variance. The adjusted BMP test
(Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010) will therefore be applied in this thesis, and its features are
elaborated on in Section 7.1.
A non-parametric test which has been proven effective by several studies is the rank test,
proposed by Corrado (1989) and adjusted by Corrado and Zivney (1992). Several studies
found that it outperforms parametric tests in terms of specification, for example Campbell
and Wesley (1993), who recommended using the rank test for NASDAQ (USA) samples.
Moreover, Maynes and Rumsey (1993) found, using Toronto SE data, that the rank test
works well for all trading frequencies. Aktas et al. (2007) recommends the rank test as a
good choice if skewness and kurtosis are present.
The rank test is intriguing due to its empirically proven performance, but it were originally
designed to test for a single-day. It may be aggregated, but still loses power for more
days in the event window. We therefore apply an adjustment of the rank test, called the
GRANK T-test (Kolari and Pynnonen, 2011). It is robust for longer event windows and
for event induced variance, as well as cross-correlation and serial-correlation of returns. It
is included as the second part of the test battery.
Hence, the test battery consists of two tests: The adjusted BMP test and the GRANK
T-test. Results from the test battery will provide a solid basis to evaluate short term
effects of the ESG Score announcements.
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7 Empirical Analysis
This section contains our empirical analysis of the ESG Score, and is structured as
follows: The adjusted BMP test is presented in section 7.1, before results of the test and
interpretation of the results are provided. Section 7.2 includes the definition of GRANK
T-test and the results using this test. Thirdly, Section 7.3 includes discussion of results
from the test battery as a whole, and is used to answer Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3.
Finally, the correlation between firm characteristics and the direction of stock price
reactions are examined using probit regression. This analysis, presented in Section 7.4, is
used to answer Hypothesis 4.
7.1 The Adjusted BMP Test
The adjusted BMP test has its origin from the original BMP test (Boehmer et al., 1991),
which accounts for event induced variance. In order to reduce the impact of highly
volatile returns when averaging abnormal returns, the original BMP test uses standardized
abnormal returns. Standardized abnormal returns weights highly volatile observations
less than other observations, by taking the observed abnormal returns divided by their







where Ait is the standardized abnormal return for security i at time t and ARit is the
actual abnormal return for security i at time t. The regression residual standard deviation
for security i and d is given by si, containing the forecasted correction term estimated by
the regression parameters in the estimation window for the event window.







where A is average standardized abnormal returns from Equation 7.1 across events in
the event window, n the sample size, and s the cross-sectional standard deviation of
30 7.1 The Adjusted BMP Test








(Ai   A)2. (7.3)
Although the original BMP test contributed to the existing literature by its simple
implementation, the test still assumes abnormal returns to be cross-sectionally uncorrelated
(Boehmer et al., 1991). As discussed in Section 6.1, this assumption causes type 1 errors
when event dates are clustered.
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) claim to have resolved the weakness of the original BMP
test. Their adjusted BMP test accounts for both induced variance in the event window
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where r is the average sample cross correlation of the estimation window residuals and SA




1  r . (7.5)
From Equation 7.4, similarities to the original BMP test, from Equation 7.2, can be drawn.




1 + (n  1)r , (7.6)
where tB is the original BMP test by Boehmer et al. (1991). In the case of no cross-
correlation, meaning r is zero, the equation equals the original BMP test (Boehmer et al.,
1991). This gives the adjusted BMP the benefit that it only corrects the test statistic
if cross correlation is present. In order to test for cumulative abnormal returns, the
original BMP test in Equation 7.2 is modified in the following way: standardized average
abnormal returns are replaced with mean standardized cumulative abnormal returns in
the numerator, and the standard deviation is replaced with the cross sectional standard
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, (7.7)
where CAR is the mean standardized cumulative abnormal return, n is the sample size, r
is the average sample cross correlation of the estimation window residuals, and SCAR is
the cross sectional standard deviation.
7.1.1 Results Adjusted BMP Test
Table 7.1 presents results for the adjusted BMP test. There are 316 positive, 640 neutral
and 322 negative events. The null hypothesis for each event window is that average
cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) equals zero.
The ten event windows consists of three main types. Post-event windows are event
windows which consists of the ESG Score announcement day, plus day(s) after the ESG
Score announcement day. Pre-event windows consists of the event day, plus day(s) before
the event day. Combined windows consists of the event day plus day(s) both before and
after the event day.
Most combined windows for positive and negative events show some evidence of ACAR
different from zero, while none of the combined windows for neutral events presents
evidence of ACAR different from zero. The evidence is not present in post-event windows,
hence the evidence in combined windows seem to be driven by pre-event windows. For
pre-event windows, ACAR different from zero is consistently detected for positive events.
There could also be, although less consistent, an effect of ACAR different from zero for
negative events. For neutral events, ACAR different from zero could be present leading
up to the ESG Score event day, but the effect is weak.
All statistically significant ACAR results, across event windows and event groups, are
positive. Results which lack statistical significance also seem to have a positive sign, but
their lack of statistical significance means that there is not enough evidence to state that
they differ from zero.
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Table 7.1: Results for the Adjusted BMP Test.
Panel: A - Positive events
Event window N ACAR Min Max Adj.BMP
[-5 , 5] 315 0.0114 -0.2402 0.4383 2.1461**
[-3 , 3] 315 0.0067 -0.1769 0.3398 1.7692*
[-1 , 1] 311 0.0040 -0.1821 0.2207 1.4938
[-5 , 0] 316 0.0105 -0.0659 0.5016 2.4943**
[-3 , 0] 316 0.0077 -0.0612 0.2695 2.5950**
[-1 , 0] 316 0.0057 -0.0477 0.1537 2.3821**
[0 , 1] 310 0.0031 -0.1657 0.2134 1.2170
[0 , 3] 314 0.0037 -0.1964 0.3553 0.8865
[0 , 5] 315 0.0052 -0.2376 0.4359 1.0474
[0 , 10] 315 0.0046 -0.2579 0.3114 1.0191
Panel: B - Negative events
Event window N ACAR Min Max Adj.BMP
[-5 , 5] 321 0.0115 -0.1592 0.3966 1.8911*
[-3 , 3] 319 0.0064 -0.1380 0.3446 1.3041
[-1 , 1] 321 0.0060 -0.0751 0.3874 1.8425*
[-5 , 0] 322 0.0090 -0.1140 0.5205 1.8643*
[-3 , 0] 322 0.0059 -0.0928 0.4013 1.6049
[-1 , 0] 322 0.0053 -0.0850 0.2752 2.0978**
[0 , 1] 320 0.0030 -0.0781 0.3747 0.6591
[0 , 3] 318 0.0026 -0.1369 0.2661 0.3426
[0 , 5] 321 0.0047 -0.1543 0.2756 0.8222
[0 , 10] 321 0.0044 -0.2042 0.7076 0.3519
Panel: C - Neutral events
Event window N ACAR Min Max Adj.BMP
[-5 , 5] 639 0.0065 -0.2154 0.7416 0.9130
[-3 , 3] 637 0.0052 -0.2937 0.3840 1.1484
[-1 , 1] 637 0.0032 -0.0616 0.2311 1.1635
[-5 , 0] 640 0.0043 -0.2071 0.1993 1.0167
[-3 , 0] 640 0.0050 -0.1817 0.1644 1.7494*
[-1 , 0] 640 0.0037 -0.0439 0.1388 1.9231*
[0 , 1] 635 0.0012 -0.0646 0.2194 -0.2319
[0 , 3] 635 0.0017 -0.1896 0.3039 -0.2078
[0 , 5] 637 0.0038 -0.2042 0.7168 0.1542
[0 , 10] 637 0.0022 -0.2781 0.6977 -0.1762
Table 7.1 summarises the results for the adjusted BMP test (Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010), with a null
hypothesis of ACAR = 0. Positive events are defined as a year-on-year ESG Score change of more than
10.61%. Negative events are defined as y/y change of -2.77%. Neutral events are defined as y/y change
lower than 10.61% and higher than -2.77%. N: Number of analysed events, ACAR: Average cumulative
abnormal return, Min: Lowest observed cumulative abnormal return (CAR), Max: Highest observed CAR,
Adj.BMP: t-statistic. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
For positive events, the evidence of ACAR different from zero is statistically significant
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at the 5 percent level in event windows [-5,5], [-5,0], [-3,0], and [-1,0]. Evidence of ACAR
different from zero in event window [-3,3] is statistically significant at the 10 percent
level. It seems to be an effect around the event day, more specifically pre-event, which
supports Hypothesis 1. The effect is consistent for all pre-event windows at the 5 percent
significance level.
For negative events, the evidence of ACAR different from zero is statistical significant
at the 10 percent level in event windows [5,5], [-1,1], and [-5,0]. For event window [-1,0],
ACAR different from zero is evident at the 5 percent significance level. It could be an
effect around the event day, more specifically pre-event, which supports Hypothesis 2.
However, evidence is not found in event window [-3,0], and the evidence in event window
[-5,0] is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. It could be that the pre-event
effect is isolated to event window [-1,0], or that the effect is not consistently detected
because it is not present for negative events.
For neutral events, ACAR different from zero is evident at the 10 percent significance
level for event windows [-3,0] and [-1,0]. Hence, there is little to none evidence of ACAR
significantly different from zero for neutral events, which supports Hypothesis 3.
The results from the adjusted BMP test generally show stronger evidence of ACAR
different from zero for positive and negative events, compared to neutral events. The
effect is isolated to pre-event windows, and consistent at the 5 percent significance level
for all pre-event windows for positive events.
7.2 The Generalized Rank T-test
The original rank test (Corrado, 1989) has the fundamental feature of transforming
abnormal returns to ranks. It means that for each event, daily observations in the
estimation window and the event window are assigned a rank, based on best to worst in
terms of magnitude of abnormal returns.
Compared to earlier tests, the original rank test (Corrado, 1989) is more robust to event-
induced variance, which is found to be 20-50 percent higher in the event window than in
the estimation window (Charest (1978); Mikkelson (1981); Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990)).
Earlier tests estimates the standard error solely from the estimation window, which could
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understate them 20. The rank test (Corrado, 1989) includes event window observations
in standard deviation calculations, which reduces the understating bias in case of event
induced variance. Corrado and Zivney (1992) improved the rank test by making the test
more robust for event-induced volatility.
The rank test was further developed in Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), where two generalized
rank tests are presented. They have several robustness features which proves helpful in
this thesis. We will apply the GRANK T-test (hereafter GRANKT), as it is more robust
to cross-sectional correlation of returns than the other test (Kolari and Pynnonen, 2011).
The most notable improvement of the GRANKT compared to the rank test (Corrado and
Zivney, 1992), is that all event day returns are compressed into one cumulative event day.
The cumulative event day is an aggregation of all returns in the event window, assigning
them to one time point. Thereafter, cumulative event day return is ranked in comparison
to the event’s daily estimation window returns. It represent a difference from the rank
test of Corrado and Zivney (1992)21, which ranks returns for each day inside the event
window separately. Ranking for each separate day before aggregating the ranks means
that information regarding magnitude of returns are lost. For example, if there are 30
percent abnormal returns on day three in the event window, the rank would be the same
as 5 percent, or even 1 percent, abnormal returns on another day if it is the highest on
that specific day.
Thus, an intuitive feature of the cumulative event day is that it does not matter how
abnormal returns are distributed across the event window, as all returns per event are
always defined as L1 + 1, which is all estimation window returns plus the return of the
cumulative event day.
The GRANKT defines Generalised Standardized Abnormal Returns (GSARit)22. In
essence, GSARit defines (i) estimation window returns similar to that of Equation 7.1 in
Section 7.1 and (ii) the cumulative event day return with a more complex standardization
method.
20Which follows the line of argument in Section 6.2.
21The rank test Corrado and Zivney (1992) was designed to test a single day for abnormal return,
but it is commonly aggregated to test for multi-day event windows. The popular aggregation method
is discussed in Cowan (1992) and Campbell and Wesley (1993), which is the implied method in this
discussion.
22The formal approach to calculating GSARit is somewhat extensive, which makes it impractical to
present in this thesis. The interested reader is therefore referred to Kolari and Pynnonen (2011).
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The test statistic of the GRANKT (Kolari and Pynnonen, 2011, p. 956) is presented
here. t = 0 defines the cumulative event day, which means that U0 defines abnormal
returns at the cumulative event day. The intuition behind the test statistic is to test
whether returns at the cumulative event day are abnormal relative to observations in the






























where nt is the number of available GSARit at time t, T = T1   T0 + 1 is the number
of observations, and t 2 T = {T0 + 1, .., T1, 0} is the set of time indices including the
estimation period t = {T0 + 1, ..., T1} and the cumulative abnormal return day at t = 0.
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7.2.1 Results GRANKT Test
Table 7.2 presents results for the GRANKT, with a null hypothesis of ACAR being equal
to zero.
The results show a trend similar to the results for the adjusted BMP test. For combined
windows, one event window presents evidence of ACAR different from zero for positive
events, and two event windows present evidence of ACAR different from zero for negative
events.
For post-event windows, there is no evidence of ACAR for positive events. This also
applies to neutral events, although one post-event window shows evidence of ACAR
different from zero at the 10 percent significance level. For negative events, one post-event
window yields ACAR different from zero, statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
This indicates a possible post-event effect, which is primarily driven by abnormal returns
on day four and five post-event for negative events. However, this is inconsistent with the
findings from the adjusted BMP test.
The evidence of ACAR in combined event windows seems to be driven by evidence in
pre-event windows. Both positive and negative pre-event windows show strong evidence
of ACAR different from zero, while there is weak to none evidence for neutral events.
Contrary to results for the adjusted BMP test, GRANKT results indicate a stronger
effect for negative events in the combined event windows, compared to positive events.
However, evidence of ACAR different from zero is strong for both positive and negative
events in pre-event windows. This indicates that the effect is weaker post-event day for
positive events compared to negative events, although no post-event event windows are
statistically significant.
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Table 7.2: Results for the Generalized Rank T-test (GRANKT).
Panel: A - Positive events
Event window N ACAR Min Max GRANKT
[-5,5] 315 0.0114 -0.2402 0.4383 1.5004
[-3,3] 315 0.0067 -0.1769 0.3398 2.4176**
[-1,1] 311 0.0040 -0.1821 0.2207 1.4857
[-5,0] 316 0.0105 -0.0659 0.5016 1.4153
[-3,0] 316 0.0077 -0.0612 0.2695 2.9044***
[-1,0] 316 0.0057 -0.0477 0.1537 3.1446***
[0,1] 310 0.0031 -0.1657 0.2134 1.4967
[0,3] 314 0.0037 -0.1964 0.3553 0.7323
[0,5] 315 0.0052 -0.2376 0.4359 1.2798
[0,10] 315 0.0046 -0.2579 0.3114 1.5746
Panel: B - Negative events
Event window N ACAR Min Max GRANKT
[-5,5] 321 0.0115 -0.1592 0.3966 2.9962***
[-3,3] 319 0.0064 -0.1380 0.3446 1.3998
[-1,1] 321 0.0060 -0.0751 0.3874 2.5557**
[-5,0] 322 0.0090 -0.1140 0.5205 3.2648***
[-3,0] 322 0.0059 -0.0928 0.4013 2.8375***
[-1,0] 322 0.0053 -0.0850 0.2752 1.6847*
[0,1] 320 0.0030 -0.0781 0.3747 0.9855
[0,3] 318 0.0026 -0.1369 0.2661 0.5441
[0,5] 321 0.0047 -0.1543 0.2756 1.9840**
[0,10] 321 0.0044 -0.2042 0.7076 0.8694
Panel: C - Neutral events
Event window N ACAR Min Max GRANKT
[-5,5] 639 0.0065 -0.2154 0.7416 1.4821
[-3,3] 637 0.0052 -0.2937 0.3840 -0.0494
[-1,1] 637 0.0032 -0.0616 0.2311 1.0173
[-5,0] 640 0.0043 -0.2071 0.1993 1.1065
[-3,0] 640 0.0050 -0.1817 0.1644 1.6939*
[-1,0] 640 0.0037 -0.0439 0.1388 1.1376
[0,1] 635 0.0012 -0.0646 0.2194 -0.0750
[0,3] 635 0.0017 -0.1896 0.3039 -1.9289*
[0,5] 637 0.0038 -0.2042 0.7168 -0.4780
[0,10] 637 0.0022 -0.2781 0.6977 -0.9883
Table 7.2 summarises the results for the GRANKT, with the null hypothesis of ACAR =0. Positive
upgrades are defined as a year-on-year ESG Score change of more than 10.61%. Negative events are
defined as y/y change of -2.77%. Neutral events are defined as y/y change lower than 10.61% and higher
than -2.77%. Average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) are associated with the respective date
of the ESG score. N: Number of analysed events, ACAR: Cumulative average abnormal return, Min:
Lowest observed cumulative abnormal return (CAR), Max: Highest observed CAR. GRANKT: t-statistic.
Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
For positive events, there is evidence of ACAR different from zero in event window [-3,3],
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statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Event windows [-3,0] and [-1,0] both show
evidence of ACAR different from zero, statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Hence, the results for positive events show strong evidence of ACAR different from zero
in days prior to the ESG Score event day, which supports Hypothesis 1.
For negative events, evidence of ACAR different from zero is present in event window
[-5,5], [-5,0], and [-3,0], statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, event
window [-1,1] and event window [0,5] both show evidence of ACAR different from zero,
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. For event window [-1,0], evidence of ACAR
different from zero is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Results for negative
events thus also show strong evidence of ACAR different from zero in days prior to the
ESG Score event day, but evidence is weaker closer to the event day. Evidence of ACAR
leading up to the event day is in line with Hypothesis 2.
For neutral events, event window [-3,0] and [0,3] presents weak evidence of ACAR different
from zero, as they both are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Generally,
there is little evidence of ACAR different from zero for neutral events, which is in line
with Hypothesis 3.
7.3 Discussion of Overall Test Results
Overall, results from both tests draw a picture of positive ACAR in pre-event windows
for both positive and negative events, indicating positive abnormal price reactions for
positive and negative events.
In pre-event windows, results of both tests indicate evidence of positive abnormal price
reactions in event window [-1,0] and [-3,0] for positive events. For negative events, results
of both tests present evidence of positive abnormal price reactions in event windows [-1,0]
and [-5,0]. These event windows are therefore of particular interest, but as they are all
pre-event windows, the following discussion is centered around evident effects prior to the
event day.
The main argument for why positive events could lead to positive abnormal price reactions
is that it could increase investors’ future profit23 expectations. The positive relationship
23Future profit expectations are future expected benefit minus future expected costs.
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between positive events and stock price reactions are similar to the findings of Bragdon
and Marlin (1972), Elayan et al. (2014), and Brogi and Lagasio (2019).
A positive event indicates that a firm has either improved its ESG initiatives, improved
its ESG reporting, or both. Either way, it shows an increased focus on ESG initiatives.
In turn, it could make investors view the firm as better positioned for the future. As
mentioned in Section 1, Nordic countries are aiming to become the world’s most sustainable
region by 2030, which likely will affect the way firms operate. It is natural to assume that
if Nordic countries are to achieve their sustainability goals, public regulators will make it
relatively more costly to operate non-sustainable, compared to operating sustainable. For
example, public regulators may affect firms by implementing favorable tax incentives for
sustainable firms, or fine non-sustainable firms. Investors may therefore view a positive
event as a sign of the firm becoming more robust to the sustainable transition.
An additional explanation for positive abnormal price reactions for positive events is an
expectation of higher future demand of the stock. It may be based on a notion that more
investors, fund managers in particular, are expected to include ESG evaluation as a part
of their investment strategies. Increased focus on ESG among investors typically leads
to more ESG-friendly fund strategies, which in turn means that fund managers will buy
stocks that satisfy ESG evaluation criteria. Hence, a positive event means that the firm
is more likely to satisfy such evaluation, leading to a higher future demand of the firm’s
stock, which should give a positive abnormal price reaction.
Similar to positive events, the main argument for why negative events could lead to
positive abnormal price reactions, is increased investor expectations of future profits. A
negative event indicate a decreased focus on ESG initiatives, which could increase future
profit expectations, depending on investors’ views on both the firm and ESG initiatives in
general. It is well-known that investor preferences are differentiated, and views on ESG
initiatives could also be differentiated. Intuition for a negative event leading to increased
profit expectations is that spending less money on ESG initiatives translates to more
money spendable in other ways - for example to other growth opportunities or paying
dividends. Negative events being correlated with positive abnormal price reactions differs
from the findings of Capelle-Blancard and Petit (2017) and Krüger (2015), but similar to
the findings of Laplante and Lanoie (1994).
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If one group of investors believe ESG initiatives are necessary to accomplish higher future
profits, while another group of investors believe ESG initiatives to be an unnecessary cost,
it is natural that they react differently to ESG Score announcements. Positive abnormal
price reactions for both positive and negative events are therefore plausible.
As mentioned, no post-event windows show evidence of abnormal price reactions.
Furthermore, there is little evidence of abnormal price reactions for neutral events. Two
main reasons for no abnormal price reactions are that (i) information provided in the ESG
Scores is already interpreted by investors, and (ii) information provided in the ESG Scores
does not affect stock prices, or at least not enough to detect abnormal price reactions.
In line with (i), the ESG Score is based on public information, as mentioned in Section
1.1. Therefore, investors may already have interpreted firms’ ESG initiatives, either
through the public information themselves or through another ESG metric. Metrics of
ESG initiatives are, as mentioned in Section 1.1, provided by many rating agencies. Other
agencies may publish their score closer to the original information disclosure, which would
decrease the impact of the ESG Score.
In line with (ii), there are reasons for ESG Scores to not lead to abnormal price reactions.
One reason is that firms report their own ESG initiatives, meaning there are likely to be
individual differences in reporting. Consequently, the information might not be useful for
investors. Another reason is that an ESG Score is not assigned to all firms, thus making
it harder for investors to compare a firm’s ESG Score to its peers.
The clearest evidence of abnormal price reactions is in the pre-event windows, which
indicates that information on ESG Scores might be leaked24 prior to the announcement.
Investors who rely on the ESG Score in their investment decisions would likely be eager
to get ahead of the market by getting access to ESG Scores before the announcement.
Another line of reasoning for the presence of abnormal price reactions in days prior to the
event day is related to co-founding events. Clustering is already presented in Section 6.1,
and many large clusters of ESG Score announcements are located at the last day of the
year. It means that days prior to the event day are actually the last trading days of the
year, which are somewhat special in finance. It is a known phenomena, which also were
discussed in Section 6.1, that investors implement strategic allocations at the end of the
24Potential reasons for leaked information were introduced in Section 4.2.
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year for tax purposes. This, or other co-founding systematic25 events, could mean that the
abnormal price reactions are caused by something else than ESG Score announcements.
There is little to no evidence of abnormal price reactions for neutral events. The
evidence from our tests could be explained by co-founding events which occurs for
positive and negative events, but not for neutral events. However, the fact that there is
little evidence of abnormal price reactions for neutral events, also makes it more plausible
that abnormal price reactions for positive and negative events are correlated to the ESG
Score announcements.
7.3.1 Differences in Test Results and Robustness of Tests
The GRANKT tends to reject the null hypothesis at a higher rate than the adjusted
BMP test, which could be explained by the adjusted BMP test being more robust for
cross-sectional correlation (Kolari and Pynnonen, 2011).
As discussed in Section 6.1, if a test is not sufficiently robust to cross-correlation, it could
lead to type 1 errors. Event dates in the data are clustered, as presented in Section 6.1,
and it follows that the GRANKT should reject the null hypothesis at a higher rate than
the adjusted BMP test if it is not robust enough for cross-sectional correlation. Note that
both tests in theory are, but Kolari & Pynnönen states that the adjusted BMP test is
additionally robust for cross-sectional correlation. From our test results, the GRANKT
does in fact reject the null hypothesis at a higher rate than the BMP test. However,
overall test results are strengthened by the fact that both tests draw the same picture,
augmenting the results presented in this thesis by showing they are not a result of a
shortcoming in a chosen test.
Furthermore, we applied the original BMP test by Boehmer et al. (1991) and the rank test
by Corrado and Zivney (1992) to further strengthen the results with respect to robustness
of our tests.
Deploying the original BMP test is an interesting check for robustness as the adjusted
BMP test by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) is designed as an improvement of it. As the
data is clustered, the original BMP test which assumes independence was expected to
25Systematic is meant as re-occurring in the same period as the ESG Scores over the time span of
interest.
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reject the null hypothesis at a higher rate than the adjusted BMP test.
The rank test (Corrado and Zivney, 1992) should reject the null hypothesis at a lower
rate than the GRANKT, because the latter is designed to have higher power than the
former. The GRANKT, as discussed in Section 7.2, is an improvement of the rank test
as it accounts for event induced variance and cross correlation. The original BMP test
and the rank test were conducted for the same events over same event windows. The
original BMP test rejects the null hypothesis at a higher rate than the adjusted BMP
test, while the rank test rejects the null hypothesis at a lower rate than the GRANKT.
These findings are in line with the predictions, and illustrates the importance of choosing
robust event study tests.
Complete test results for the original BMP test and rank test are presented in Table A2.7
in Appendix A2.
7.4 Firm Characteristics
In this section, we address Hypothesis 4. Our aim is, as evident from Hypothesis 4, to
investigate whether certain firm characteristics are associated with stock price reactions
for positive or negative events. Correlation between firm characteristics and stock price
reactions are investigated by probit regressions.
7.4.1 Probit Regression Models
Empirical studies have shown that several firm characteristics affect future stock prices
(Kogan and Papanikolaou, 2013). A probit regression maximises the likelihood of observing
a binary outcome of the dependent variable, by using relevant explanatory variables
(Wooldridge, 2013). Hence, the regression outputs are used to interpret if explanatory
variables increase the likelihood of the outcome.
In our probit regressions, the dependent variable has two possible outcomes: positive
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) (1), and negative cumulative abnormal returns (0).
Positive CAR is thus positive abnormal price reactions, and negative CAR is negative
abnormal stock price reactions. As outcomes are binary and mutually exclusive, an
increased likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions means a decreased likelihood of
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negative abnormal price reactions, and vice versa.
The dependent variable is a non-linear function of the explanatory variables, and
interpretation of coefficients are consequently not straightforward. Coefficients in probit
regressions only indicate at what statistical significance level a relationship is likely to
exist, and the direction of the relationship. Therefore, marginal effects are estimated.
A marginal effect express the change in the likelihood of positive cumulative abnormal
returns, given a change in the explanatory variable - all else equal (Wooldridge, 2013).
The strength of probit regressions are tested by a chi-square test. If the chi-square test
statistic, presented in the output of our probit regressions, is not significant, the regression
does not account for more of the variation in CAR than one would expect by chance.
The probit model is given as:
P (Y = 1) =  ( 0 +  ixi), (7.11)
where P is the response likelihood, Y is the dependent variable,   is the cumulative
distribution function of the normal distribution,  0 is the regression constant, and  i is the
coefficient estimate for explanatory variable xi. i is the number of explanatory variables
in the estimated model.
7.4.2 Explanatory Variables
One characteristic of interest is a firm’s size. There are several reasons for price reactions
to differ across firms of different size, where one reason is information asymmetry.
Investors typically have more information on larger firms than smaller firms, due to
more comprehensive coverage by analysts and the media. Consequently, changes in ESG
Score could be less anticipated for smaller firms, in turn leading to a more notable price
reaction. We found evidence in our event study that a majority of investors26 view both
positive and negative events as good news, as they both yield positive ACAR. Thus,
our information asymmetry argument means that both positive and negative events are
less anticipated good news for small firms, compared to large firms. Hence, a negative
26The overall impact, as shown event study results in Section 7.1.1 and Section 7.2.1, is positive ACAR,
but that does not mean that all investors interpret information the same way. Thus, the use of "majority
of investors".
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relationship is expected between the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions and
size for both positive and negative events.
On the same line of argument, meaning information on larger firms is more available to the
public, the opposite relationship between size and price reactions could also be expected for
positive and negative events. More available information could mean that large firms face
more pressure from public regulators, compared to smaller firms. Given the Nordic goals of
sustainability (Nordic Council, 2020), public regulators in the Nordic have an incentive to
progress sustainable development. Therefore, large firms may benefit more from positive
events compared to smaller firms, as pressure from public regulators are relatively more
decreased. It indicates a positive relationship between positive abnormal price reactions
and size. Using this argument for negative events, the relationship between positive
abnormal price reactions and size should be negative, as we expect public regulators to
interpret negative events as bad news.
Dang et al. (2018) find that several measures should be used for size to ensure precise
results, as different measures have both advantages and disadvantages. Total assets is
an accounting based measure, based on historical information, and reflects the firm’s
amount of resources. However, the firm’s accounting preferences could impact total assets
in ways which reduces the precision of comparing total assets across firms. For example,
(i) IFRS27 allows individual variation in estimations, (ii) depreciation might have a time
lag in accounting-based measures, and (iii) firms vary in their debt exposure.
Using market capitalisation, a market-based measure, avoids the mentioned problems of
total assets. However, stock market imperfections means that market-based measures also
have disadvantages. For example, the liquidity of a stock could affect its price, in turns
causing stock price an imprecise measure for size.
Total assets does not rely on investor expectations. Therefore, both total assets and
market capitalisation are used as proxies for size, and used as explanatory variables in
our probit regressions. In order to avoid skewness, the natural logarithm is used28. The
variables are defined as ln.asset and ln.mcap in our regressions.
27IFRS stands for International Financial Reporting Standards, and firms included in this study follow
these.
28Market capitalization is fat-tailed, meaning there are more large cap firms than small cap firms.
Using natural logarithms are a way of normalising the distribution.
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Another characteristic of interest is the firm’s initial ESG Score, which is typically set
the previous year. A high initial ESG Score reflects that the firm is already doing well in
terms of ESG initiatives and reporting. A positive event could ensure investors that the
firm remains committed to improving their ESG initiatives. Hence, a positive relationship
is expected between the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions and ESG Score for
positive events.
For negative events, a firm with a high ESG Score initially, could be worse of compared to
a firm with a low ESG score initially. Intuition is that investors who value ESG initiatives
are more likely to invest in firms with a high ESG Score. Firms with a low initial ESG
Score, however, were never attractive to investors due to ESG initiatives in the first place.
Thus, the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions is expected to be higher for firms
with an initial low ESG Score, compared to firms with an initial high ESG Score. ESG
Score is set as the dummy ESG.d in the probit regressions, set to 1 if the firm has a score
of 50 or higher, and 0 if not29.
The third characteristic of interest is related to industry. The motivation for including
fossil fuels as an industry dummy is that operations within fossil fuels are by nature not
sustainable, and the industry is being criticized for their impact on the environment.
Furthermore, the fossil fuels industry is viewed as particularly relevant for this analysis as
the Norwegian economy is centered around it. The motivation for including a dummy for
banking and investment services is the findings of Brogi and Lagasio (2019), as presented
in Section 2. The researchers found that increased ESG initiatives were associated with
higher return on assets (ROA) for the banking and investment industry, relative to other
industries. If the same relationship exists in the Nordic market, we expect a higher
likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions for the banking sector in association with a
positive event. Two dummy variables are defined: Fossil.d is set to 1 if the firm operates
within fossil fuels, and 0 if not. Bank.d is set to 1 if the firm operates within banking
and investments services, and 0 if not.
The fourth characteristic of interest is financial performance. Intuition is that ESG
initiatives are costly, and financial performance could indicate how well firms are suited to
invest in them. Investors may interpret that financially well-performing firms could afford
29The ESG Score range from 1-100. A high score is defined as a ESG Score of 50 or higher
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ESG investing to a larger degree than firms which are not performing as well financially.
Moreover, investors could find focusing on the underlying operation more sensible than
investing in ESG initiatives when financial performance is weak. If so, the relationship
between financial performance and the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions are
expected to be positive for positive events and negative for negative events.
Measuring financial performance might be done in various forms. ROA is according to
Hult et al. (2008) one of the most commonly used proxies for financial performance in
empirical research. ROA is measured as net income/total assets, and defined as ROA in
our probit regressions. To ensure robustness, two different variables are applied as proxies
for financial performance. The second proxy is EBITDA-margin30, also an accounting
measure, but one that limits some of the imprecision mentioned for total assets. For
example, EBITDA-margin is not sensitive to choice of depreciation profile and one-off
financial effects outside of the operation. Ideally, EBITDA-margin should be normalized
to provide a more accurate comparison between firms, but that is outside the scope of
this thesis. EBITDA-marign is defined as Ebitda in the probit regression.
The fifth characteristic of interest is volatility. Volatility is measured by the explanatory
variable Beta, which is calculated in the events’ respective estimation window. Beta
is the volatility of the stock relative to the market, measured by the respective value-
weighted market index, as specified in Section 4.4. The motivation for including beta
as an explanatory variable is that investors might interpret a firm with a higher Beta
as riskier, and investor who value ESG initiatives could therefore be more reluctant to
invest in these despite a positive event. For negative events, investors who value ESG
initiatives could view firms with a low Beta as more robust to ESG Score changes as
they by nature are less risky. Thus, we expect the relationship between the likelihood of
positive abnormal price reactions and beta to be negative for positive events and negative
events.
The last characteristic of interest is time. A time dummy is included, which corresponds
to 1 if the event occurs in 2017 or later, and 0 otherwise. The dummy is included because
the focus on ESG initiatives in investment decisions has undoubtedly increased over
30EBITDA-margin is EBITDA as a percentage of sales. EBITDA is Earnings Before Interest, Taxes,
Depreciation and Amortization. Note that the margin typically varies across industries, but it does not
affect the purpose of the variable in this analysis.
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time, as mentioned Section 1. We therefore expect investors to be more positive to ESG
initiatives, and thus more positive to positive events and less positive to negative events,
when the time dummy equals one. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between
the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions and the time dummy for positive events.
The relationship between the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions and the time
dummy is expected to be negative for negative events, and the time dummy is defined as
T ime.d in the probit regressions.
To isolate the relationship between the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions
and each explanatory variable, correlation between explanatory variables is examined.
Results are presented in a correlation matrix, which is found in Figure A3.1 in Appendix
A3. The only variables which are strongly correlated are ln.asset and ln.mcap, and they
are therefore not included in the same models31.
Thus, our probit models are given in the following. Model 1 and model 2 differs by the
former including ln.asset as an explanatory variable, while it is replaced by ln.mcap in
the latter. Model 3 is structured the same way as model 1, but applied to another event
window. Likewise, model 4 is structured the same way as model 2, but applied to another
event window. Model 1 is given in Equation 7.12, and model 2 is given in Equation 7.13.
(7.12)P (PositiveCAR = 1) =  ( 0 +  1Betai +  2ROAi +  3Ebitdai +  4ln.asseti
+  5ESG.di +  6Fossil.di +  7Bank.di +  8T ime.di) .
(7.13)P (PositiveCAR = 1) =  ( 0 +  1Betai +  2ROAi +  3Ebitdai +  4ln.mcapi
+  5ESG.di +  6Fossil.di +  7Bank.di +  8T ime.di) .
7.4.3 Probit Regression Output
Following our discussion in Section 7.3, event windows [-1,0] and [-3,0] for positive events,
and event windows [-1,0] and [-5,0] for negative events are chosen as most relevant for
further analysis. Hence, the effect of firm characteristics are examined in these windows.
Table 7.3 presents probit regression results for positive events. Size proxies ln.asset and
ln.mcap are significant in all four regression models. Coefficients for both variables are
31It follows from correlation results and intuition that including both size variables in the same model
could cause multicollinearity problems.
48 7.4 Firm Characteristics
negative, meaning larger firms are less likely to have positive abnormal price reactions for
positive events. Consequently, there is a positive relationship between being a small firm32
and the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions after a positive event. A possible
reason for the negative relationship, as introduced in Section 7.4.2, is that investors are
more surprised by positive events for small firms due to information asymmetry.
Our choice of including two proxies for size, in line with Dang et al. (2018), means that
our results are robust as coefficients of both proxies are pointing in the same direction.
There seems to be a relationship between size and the likelihood of positive abnormal
price reactions.
As Bank.d is not statistically significant, we do not find evidence to support the findings
of Brogi and Lagasio (2019). A possible explanation is that a broader focus on ESG across
industries in the Nordic implies that the banking industry does not stand out in the same
way as in the United States. Similar to the banking industry, Fossil.d indicates that the
fossil fuels industry does not seem to stand out relatively to other industries.
Neither ROA nor Ebitda present evidence of a relationship between financial performance
and the likelihood of observing positive abnormal price reactions for positive events. It
could mean that investors do not have a preference between a financially well-performing
firm and a financially weak-performing firm when ESG initiatives are notably improved.
Another possible explanation for no evident relationship is that our explanatory variables
do not represent precise proxies for financial performance.
Coefficients for ESG.d do not present evidence of an existing preferences for investors
related to the previous year’s ESG Score. Furthermore, Beta is not statistically significant
for any model, indicating that (i) volatility does not affect the likelihood of positive
abnormal price reactions for positive events, or (ii) the measurement of volatility does not
capture the effect.
32Small firms and large firms are interpreted within the data set. A small firm is thus small relatively
to other firms examined.
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Table 7.3: Probit Regression results for Positive Events.
Dependent variable
(1 = Positive CAR, 0 = Negative CAR)
Event window [-1,0] Event window [-3,0]
Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4)
Beta -0.1299 -0.0720 0.0184 0.1212
ROA -0.4957 0.0934 0.0173 0.5890
Ebitda -0.3020 -0.2173 0.0728 0.1468
ln.asset -0.1036* - -0.1138* -
ln.mcap - -0.1970*** - -0.2726***
ESG.d -0.0413 0.0321 -0.0467 0.0841
Fossil.d 0.3399 0.2258 0.4340 0.2636
Bank.d 0.3038 0.1356 -0.0667 -0.2501
Time.d 0.3951*** 0.3725** 0.4630*** 0.4375***
cons 2.4065* 4.2924*** 2.3042* 5.5521***
N 294 294 294 294
Pseudo R2 0.0408 0.0538 0.0504 0.0798
Chi-square 16.32** 21.49*** 20.31*** 32.11***
Table 7.3 summarises probit regression results for positive events in event window [-1,0] and [-3,0]. The
dependent variable is a binary variable with 2 possible outcomes where 1 = Positive cumulative abnormal
return (CAR), and 0 = Negative CAR. Positive events are defined as an ESG score year-on-year change
> 10.61%. The probit regression is estimated by:
P (Positive CAR = 1) =  ( 0 +  1Betai +  2ROAi +  3Ebitdai +  4ln.asseti +  5ln.mcapi +
 6ESG.di +  7Fossil.di +  8Bank.di +  9T ime.di). Beta: Stock volatility (stock return variation in
relation to market return variation) in estimation window for firm i. Ebitda: EBITDA margin (Percentage
measure calculated by EBITDA/total sales for firm i). ROA: Return on assets (Calculated as income after
taxes for fiscal year (FY) divided by average total assets of FY). ln.asset: Natural logarithm of average
total assets in FY. ln.mcap: Natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of FY (Calculated
by last share price of FY*total shares outstanding). ESG.d: Dummy variable which equals 1 if ESG
scores >50 for previous year, and 0 otherwise. Fossil.d: Dummy variable equal 1 if firm i operates in
the fossil fuel sector. Bank.id: Dummy variable equal 1 if firm i operates in the banking sector. Time.d:
Time dummy that equals 1 if the observation was in 2017 or later. cons: Regression constant. N: Total
number of observations. Pseudo R2: Mc Faddens R2. Model (1): Variable ln.mcap excluded. Model (2):
Variable ln.asset excluded. Model (3): Variable ln.mcap excluded. Model (4): Variable ln.asset excluded.
Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
The time dummy T ime.d is statistically significant at the 1 percent for all models but
model 2, where it is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Therefore, there is
strong evidence of positive events dated 2017 or later being more likely to have positive
abnormal price reactions in days prior to the event. It is in line with our reasoning in
Section 7.4.2, where we predicted this relationship.
Marginal effects for positive and negative events are estimated for all coefficients, and
results are presented in Table A3.3 in Appendix A3. Only findings important for our
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analysis are discussed here.
A 1 percent increase in ln.mcap decreases the likelihood of positive cumulative abnormal
returns by 7.25 percent for model 2, and 9.83 percent for model 4. For ln.asset, an increase
of 1 percent in total assets decreases the likelihood of positive cumulative abnormal returns
by 3.87 percent in model 1 and 4.24 percent in model 3. If T ime.d equals 1, meaning
the event occurs in 2017 or later, there is a 14.75 percent higher likelihood of positive
abnormal price reactions in model 1, and 13.70 percent in model 2. For event window
[-3,0], the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions increases by 17.25 percent for
model 3, and 15.77 percent for model 4 when T ime.d equals 1.
Table 7.4 presents probit regression results for negative events. Similar to the findings
for positive events, dummies Fossil.d and Bank.d, as well as ESG.d, do not indicate a
relationship with the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions for negative events.
Results for negative events show a negative relationship between the likelihood of observing
positive abnormal price reactions, and the firm’s ROA for model 1, 3, and 4. An
explanation for the negative relationship is that firms with weak financial performance
are less suited to implement costly ESG initiatives. Thus, investors would interpret a
negative event for financially weak-performing firms as better news relatively to financially
well-performing firm. On the other hand, Ebitda supports no such relationship, and
ROA is only highly significant for event window [-1,0]. The possible relationship between
financial performance and the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions are therefore
interpreted with caution.
Results for Beta indicates little evidence of a relationship between volatility and the
likelihood of abnormal stock price reactions. Model 3 and 4 indicate a negative relationship
between the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions and volatility. However, results
are only significant at the 10 percent level, and only for event window [-5,0].
Furthermore, size proxies ln.asset and ln.mcap, are significant at the 1 percent in model
3 and model 2. In model 4, ln.mcap is statistical significant at the 10 percent level. In
model 1, ln.asset is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Similar to results for
positive events, coefficients for ln.asset and ln.mcap are negative, meaning larger firms
are less likely to have positive abnormal price reactions for negative events.
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Table 7.4: Probit Regression Results for Negative Events.
Dependent variable
(1 = Positive CAR, 0 = Negative CAR)
Event window [-1,0] Event window [-5,0]
Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4)
Beta -0.0794 -0.0570 -0.3594* -0.3724*
ROA -2.9892*** -1.9808** -1.3755* -0.6989
Ebitda 0.4610 0.4039 -0.1176 -0.1233
ln.asset -0.1533** - -0.1530*** -
ln.mcap - -0.1938*** - -0.1103*
ESG.d -0.2409 -0.2162 -0.1969 -0.2504
Fossil.d -0.1201 -0.1286 0.1268 0.1289
Bank.d 0.4801 0.2525 0.3046 -0.0341
Time.d 0.4517*** 0.4775*** 0.0227 -0.0681
cons 3.4924*** 4.2563*** 4.0693*** 3.1023**
N 315 315 315 315
Pseudo R2 0.0895 0.0931 0.0549 0.0455
Chi-square 39.08*** 40.63*** 23.72*** 19.65***
Table 7.4 summarises probit regression results for positive events in event window [-1,0] and [-3,0]. The
dependent variable is a binary variable with 2 possible outcomes where 1 = Positive cumulative abnormal
return (CAR), and 0 = Negative CAR. Negative events are identified with y/y change of -2.77%. The
probit regression is estimated by:
P (Positive CAR = 1) =  ( 0 +  1Betai +  2ROAi +  3Ebitdai +  4ln.asseti +  5ln.mcapi +
 6ESG.di +  7Fossil.di +  8Bank.di +  9T ime.di). Beta: Stock volatility (stock return variation in
relation to market return variation) in estimation window for firm i. Ebitda: EBITDA margin (Percentage
measure calculated by EBITDA/total sales for firm i). ROA: Return on assets (Calculated as income after
taxes for fiscal year (FY) divided by average total assets of FY). ln.asset: Natural logarithm of average
total assets in FY. ln.mcap: Natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of FY (Calculated by
last share price of FY*total shares outstanding). ESG.d: Dummy variable which equals 1 if ESG scores
>50 for previous year, 0 otherwise. Fossil.d: Dummy variable equal 1 if firm i operates in the fossil fuel
sector. Bank.id: Dummy variable equal 1 if firm i operates in the banking sector. Time.d: Time dummy
that equals 1 if the observation was in 2017 or later. cons: Regression constant. N: Total number of
observations. Pseudo R2: Mc Faddens R2. Model (1): Variable Ebitda and ln.mcap excluded. Model
(2): Variable Ebitda and ln.asset excluded. Model (3): Variables ROA and ln.mcap excluded. Model (4):
Variables ROA and ln.asset excluded. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***,
respectively.
The time dummy T ime.d is statistically significant at the 1 percent level for model 1 and
2, and not statistically significant at all for model 3 and 4. Hence, it seems to be a positive
relationship between the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions and T ime.d close
to a negative event, but the effect is not present when examining the longer event window
[-5,0]. The relationship is positive, meaning positive abnormal price reactions is more
likely for events in 2017 or later. It is in opposition of our expected relationship, but
in line with the results of the event study - where we found negative news to be good
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news for investors. Results for T ime.d in event window [-1,0] indicates that this effect is
stronger for recent years.
From Table A3.3 in Appendix A3, the following marginal effects are estimated. A 1
percent increase in ln.mcap decreases the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions
by 6.95 percent for model 2, and 4.14 percent for model 4. For ln.asset, an increase of 1
percent in total assets decreases the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions by
5.52 percent in model 1 and 5.69 percent in model 3. For T ime.d, negative events in 2017
and later have a 16.28 percent higher likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions in
event window [-1,0] for model 1. The likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions is
17.13 percent when ln.asset is replaced by ln.mcap.
To summarize, results for both positive and negative events indicates that size and T ime.d
interacts with the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions in our selected event
windows. For size, smaller firms have a higher likelihood of positive abnormal price
reactions, an effect which seems to be present for all event windows, where ln.mcap seems
to be a better explanatory variable than ln.asset. For T ime.d, more recent events are
more likely to have positive abnormal price reactions, an effect which is highly statistically
significant for both event windows for positive events, and also highly statistically significant
for event window [-1,0] for negative events. The effect is not present for the longer pre-event
window for negative events, [-5,0].
In addition to our analysis on firm characteristics correlated to stock price reactions around
positive and negative events, we have conducted a multionominal logistic regression to
examine which firm characteristics correlate to firms earning a positive or a negative event
in the first place. Results, as well as a short explanation of the multinominal logistic
regression, is placed in Appendix A4. The interested reader is therefore referred to Section
A4.1 in Appendix A4.
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8 Conclusion
Previous research on the relationship between ESG related announcements and stock
price reactions provide no clear consensus on an existing relationship between them.
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that stock price reactions to ESG announcements
differ across regions, based on investor preferences.
We examine stock price reactions to ESG Score announcements in the Nordic market
between 2011 and 2019, where the Nordic market is defined as Sweden, Denmark, Norway,
and Finland. These countries are of particular interest due to their focus on sustainability,
evident from the goal of becoming the most sustainable region in the world by 2030
(Nordic Council, 2020).
Our primary aim was to examine the most extreme announcements, which is defined
by how much the new ESG Score differ from the last year’s ESG Score. Therefore,
year-on-year changes were divided into positive, negative, and neutral events. Positive
events are defined as ESG Score changes of more than 10.61 percent. Negative events
are defined as ESG Score changes of less than -2.77, while neutral events are changes in
between positive and negative events.
Our first hypothesis was that announcements of positive events are associated with
abnormal stock price reactions, while the second hypothesis was that negative events are
associated with abnormal stock price reactions. There is evidence of abnormal stock price
reactions around the ESG Score announcements for both positive and negative events.
Evidence for both event groups is located in pre-event windows, which could indicate that
information regarding ESG Scores is leaked prior to the event date. Results of the adjusted
BMP test detects abnormal price reactions primarily for positive events, while the results
of the GRANKT test shows the strongest evidence for negative events. However, the
results of both tests present evidence of abnormal price reactions for both positive and
negative events. These findings indicate that the ESG Score announcements represent
new information for investors.
Our third hypothesis was that neutral events are not associated with abnormal stock price
reactions. There is no evidence of abnormal stock price reactions around neutral events
at the 5 percent statistical significance level.
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Abnormal price reactions are positive for both positive and negative events, indicating
that both positive and negative events could present good news for investors. These
findings point to investor views being differentiated, where some investors value ESG
initiatives and others do not.
As most events are clustered around the turn of a new year, there could be systematic
co-founding events which causes abnormal price reactions. However, that does not explain
different findings for positive and negative events, compared to neutral events. On the
contrary, it supports a notion that evidence of abnormal price reactions could be related
to the ESG Score announcements.
Our fourth and final hypothesis was that certain firm characteristics are correlated with
positive and/or negative stock price reactions. On that note, evidence shows that smaller
firms are more likely to be correlated with positive abnormal stock price reactions for both
positive and negative events. Furthermore, positive abnormal stock price reactions are
more likely prior to the event day if the event occurred in 2017 or later. A possible reason
for the findings across time, is that in later years, ESG initiatives are included in more
investment decisions. Thus, as we found in the event study that both positive and negative
events represents good news to investors, it also makes sense that the relationship between
the likelihood of positive abnormal price reactions and our time dummy is positive. For
the findings on size, an explanation is information asymmetry. There is typically less
available information on small firms compared to large firms, which means events are less
anticipated by investors. Again, as both positive and negative events are good news to
investors, it is reasonable that smaller firms are more likely to be associated with positive
abnormal stock price reactions for both event types.
As more companies get rated by Thomson Reuters, their database on ESG Scores are
likely to become more extensive over time. Hence, examining stock price reactions to ESG
Score announcements could be even more interesting in the future, as it would be possible
to draw conclusions for a larger part of the Nordic stock universe.
Comparing price reactions across more countries could also be interesting, in order to
examine the differences between investors’ view on ESG initiatives in detail. Furthermore,
future researchers are encouraged to investigate additional firm characteristics which could
be correlated with positive stock price reactions around ESG Score announcements.
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Figure A1.1: Residual Plots for Axfood AB Listed at the Nasdaq Stockholm Stock
Exchange in Sweden.
Figure A1.1 shows four different residual plots for Axfood AB regressed on the Value Weighted Index
(OMXS30NEXTGI), in the estimation window [-200,-10] with event date 31.12.2012. The upper left plot
is the normal probability plot (qnorm), which indicates whether the residuals are normally distributed
or not. To the upper right is a linearity plot, we test whether the linearity assumption between firm
returns and index returns hold. To the lower left is a residuals vs. observations order plot, which indicates
whether the residuals are uncorrelated or not. To the lower right is the residual vs. fitted value plot, which
indicates whether the residuals have constant variance (homoscedasticity) or not (heteroscedasticity).
Deviations from the trend line are minor, and the normality assumption is accepted.
There are a few outliers in the linearity plot, but observations generally do not deviate
much from linearity. No clear relationship between residuals is identified in the residual
vs. observation order plot , and we find the correlation assumption reasonable. Lastly,
the residual vs. fitted value plot gives reason to believe that there could be a minor issue
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of heteroscedasticity as the variance increases towards zero. Generally, the residual plots
give reason to believe that we have unbiased estimators for predicting normal returns.
Potential heteroscedasticity could however be a minor issue.
Figure A1.2: Residual Plots for BW Offshore Ltd Listed at Oslo Børs Stock Exchange
in Norway.
Figure A1.2 shows four different residual plots for BW Offshore Ltd regressed on the Value Weighted
Index (OMXO20GI), in the estimation window [-200,-10] for event date 31.12.2019. The upper left plot is
the normal probability plot (qnorm), which indicates whether the residuals are normally distributed or
not. To the upper right is a linearity plot where we test whether the linearity assumption between firm
returns and index returns hold. To the lower left is a residuals vs. observations order plot, which indicates
whether the residuals are uncorrelated or not. To the lower right is the residual vs. fitted value plot, which
indicates whether the residuals have constant variance (homoscedasticity) or not (heteroscedasticity).
Deviations from the trend line are minor, and the normality assumption is accepted.
There are a few observed outliers in the linearity plot, but observations do not deviate
much from linearity. No clear relationship between residuals is identified in the residual vs.
observation order plot, and we find the correlation assumption reasonable. Although there
are some outliers in the residual vs. fitted values plot, the plot gives reason to believe
that the constant variance assumption can be accepted. Generally, the residual plots give
reason to believe that we have unbiased estimators for predicting normal returns, as there
are no major problems for the assumptions.
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Figure A1.3: Residual Plots for EAC Invest AS Listed at the Nasdaq Copenhagen Stock
Exchange in Denmark.
Figure A1.3 shows four different residual plots for EAC Invest AS regressed on the Value Weighted Index
(OMXC20), in the estimation window [-200,-10] for event date 31.12.2011. the upper left plot is the
normal probability plot (qnorm), which indicates whether the residuals are normally distributed or not.
To the upper right we test whether the linearity assumption between firm returns and index returns hold.
To the lower left is a residuals vs. observations order plot, which indicates whether the residuals are
uncorrelated or not. To the lower right is the residual vs. fitted value plot, which indicates whether the
residuals have constant variance (homoscedasticity) or not (heteroscedasticity).
Deviations from the trend line are minor, and the normality assumption is accepted. There
are a few observed outliers in the linearity plot, observations do not to deviate too much
from linearity. No clear relationship between residuals are identified in the residual vs.
observation order plot, and the correlation assumption is accepted. Although there are
some outliers, the residual vs. fitted values plot gives reason to believe that the constant
variance assumption can be accepted. Generally, the residual plots give reason to believe
that we have unbiased estimators for predicting normal returns, as there are no major
problems present.
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Figure A1.4: Residual Plots for Caverion Group Listed at the Nasdaq Helsinki Stock
Exchange in Finland.
Figure A1.4 shows four different residual plots for Caverion Group regressed on the Value Weighted Index
(OMXH25), in the estimation window [-200,-10] for event date 31.12.2019. Upper left figure is the normal
probability plot (qnorm), which indicates whether the residuals are normally distributed or not. To the
upper right we test whether the linearity assumption between firm returns and index returns hold. To the
lower left is a residuals vs. observations order plot, which indicates whether the residuals are uncorrelated
or not. To the lower right is the residual vs. fitted value plot, which indicates whether the residuals have
constant variance (homoscedasticity) or not (heteroscedasticity).
Deviations from the trend line in the normality plot are minor, and the normality
assumption can be accepted. Observations in the linearity plot indicate a linear relationship
between company returns and index returns, and the linearity assumption seems reasonable.
As no clear relationship between residuals is identified in the residual vs. observation
order plot, we find the correlation assumption to hold. Apart from the observed outliers,
the residuals vs. fitted values plot gives reason to believe that the constant variance
assumption can be accepted. Generally, the residual plots give reason to believe that we
have unbiased estimators for predicting normal returns, as there are no major problems
present.
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Table A1.1: Summary Statistics for Market Model Residuals.
Ticker Event date Breuch Pagan Durbin Watson Normality
CARLb.CO* 02/01/2012 0.0335 1.640 OK
AAK.ST 02/01/2020 0.9989 1.343 OK
AKAS.OL 02/01/2013 0.5175 2.007 OK
COLOb.CO 30/09/2015 0.2000 1.635 OK
SECTb.ST 30/04/2019 0.3360 1.635 OK
BOL.ST 02/01/2012 0.0885 1.837 OK
CGCBV.HE* 04/01/2016 0.0016 1.826 OK
HUH1V.HE 02/01/2020 0.6901 1.886 OK
DNO.OL 02/01/2012 0.7735 1.711 OK-
BO.CO 03/06/2019 0.6566 1.887 OK
DSV.CO 02/01/2015 0.3253 1.661 OK-
MAERSKb.CO 04/01/2016 0.9060 1.636 OK
KNEBV.HE 02/01/2012 0.6813 1.977 OK
EKTAb.ST 30/04/2013 0.5423 1.437 OK
NCCb.ST 02/01/2017 0.3632 1.516 OK
BERGb.ST 03/04/2018 0.6547 1.587 OK
DNB.OL* 02/01/2018 0.6917 1.679 OK
GJES.OL 02/01/2017 0.0924 1.709 OK
UPONOR.HE* 02/01/2018 0.2953 1.669 OK
REC.OL 02/01/2017 0.9248 1.811 OK
KCRA.HE* 02/01/2019 0.8978 1.788 OK
Table A1.1 presents test results for residuals to check OLS assumptions for the market model. Residuals
are tested for 20 different estimation windows, where firm returns are regressed on index returns. All
estimation windows range from [-200,-10] relatively to the event date presented. Breuch Pagan: p-values
to check for for homoscedasticity. Null hypothesis is constant variance (homoscedasticity). Durbin Watson:
Test statistic to check for independece. n = 190 and one independent variable (market index) gives lower
critical value (dL) of 1.758 at the 5 percent level. A Durbin Watson statistic below 1.758 means there is
evidence of positive serial correlation, and if 4 minus the Durbin-Watson statistic is below 1.758, there is
evidence of negative serial correlation. Normality: Check for normality assumption. The check is done by
examining histograms of the residuals. Presenting all histograms in the appendix should be of minimal
use to the reader, but they are available upon request. OK means that the normality assumption is
accepted. OK- means that histograms are slightly skewed to the right. KCRA.HE*: 1 outlier removed.
Original Breuch Pagan value 0.0043. UPONOR.HE*: 2 outliers removed. Original Brech Pagan value
0.0000. DNB.OL*: 4 outliers removed. Original Breuch Pagan value 0.0001. CGCBV.HE*: 2 outliers
removed. Original Breuch Pagan value 0.0016. CARLb.CO*: 1 outlier removed. Original Breuch Pagan
value 0.0335.
Table A1.1 is used to test whether OLS assumptions hold for the market model.There is
evidence of heteroscedasticity at the 5 percent level for five estimation windows, but there
is no evidence when a few outliers are removed. Thus, the homoscedasticity assumption
seems reasonable. About half of estimation windows have some evidence of positive serial
correlations, but problems seem minor. The normality assumption seems to hold.
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Table A1.2: Summary of Regression Results for Defining the Market Models.
Norway Ticker  1 cons Adj.R2 N
Main-index OSEBX 1.174*** -0.000 0.188 45102
Value weighted OMXO20GI 1.100*** -0.000*** 0.183 45102
Sweden
All shares OMXSGI 0.987*** -0.000*** 0.267 105687
Mid-cap OMXSMCGI 1.072*** -0.000*** 0.222 105687
Large-cap OMXSLCGI 0.952*** 0.000*** 0.265 105687
Industrials SX50GI 0.749*** -0.000*** 0.242 105687
Value weighted OMXS30NEXTGI 0.935*** -0.000** 0.251 105687
Finland
Mid-cap OMXHMCGI 1.2341*** -0.000** 0.270 42750
Large-cap OMXHLCGI 1.0206*** -0.000** 0.337 42750
Industrials HX50GI 0.895*** -0.000** 0.314 42750
Value weighted OMXH25 1.002*** -0.000 0.345 42750
Denmark
Mid-cap OMXCMCGI 0.927*** 0.000 0.116 46462
All shares index OMXCGI 0.932*** -0.000 0.144 46462
Value weighted OMXC20 0.794*** -0.000 0.128 46462
Table A1.2 holds summary regression statistics for defining market models for Norway, Sweden, Finland,
and Denmark. Daily stock returns in the estimation window [-200,-10] for all defined events from 2011 to
2020 are regressed on respective daily index returns. Ticker: Index identifier.  1: Regression estimator.
cons: Regression constant. Adj.R2: Measure of regression explanatory power. N: Number of observations
examined. OSEBX: The Norwegian main index. OMXO20GI: The Norwegian value weighted index
consisting of the 20 most traded securities. OMXSGI: The Swedish all-shares index. OMXSMCGI:
Swedish mid-cap index. OMXSLCGI: The Swedish large-cap index. SX50GI: The Swedish industrials
industry index. OMXS30NEXTGI: The Swedish value weighted index consisting of the 30 most traded
securities in Sweden. OMXHMCGI: The Finish mid-cap index. OMXHLCGI: The Finish large-cap index.
HX50GI: The Finish industrials industry index. OMXH25: The Finish value weighted index consisting of
the 25 most traded shares in Finland. OMXCMCGI: The Danish mid-cap index. OMXCGI: the Danish
all shares index. OMXC20: The Danish value weighted index consisting of the 20 most traded securities
in Denmark. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Table A1.2 presents test results for stock returns regressed on indices to determine best fit
for market models. For Sweden, the large-cap index and value-weighted index have highest
explanatory power with R2 respectively of 26.5% and 25.1%. Similar for Finland, with R2
of 33.7% for the large-cap index and 34.5% for the value weighted index. For Denmark,
the all shares index and the value weighted index has highest explanatory power with R2
of respectively 14.4% and 12.8%. For Norway, the main index and the value weighted
index have R2 of 18.8% and 18.3%.
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A2.1 Normality for Event Window Observations
Figure A2.1: Summary of Simple and the Natural Logarithm of Abnormal Returns for
all Events.
Panel A: Negative events
Panel B: Positive events
Panel C: Neutral events
Figure A2.1 shows the distribution of simple and log abnormal returns in the event window [-3, 3]
associated with an ESG score change. Panel A shows the distribution for events categorized as negative.
Negative events are identified as ESG score y/y change of -2.77% or more. Panel B shows the distribution
for events categorized as positive. Positive events are identified as ESG score year-on-year changes of
more than 10.61%. Panel C shows the distribution for events categorized as neutral. Neutral events are
identified as y/y change lower than 10.61% and higher than -2.77%.
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A2.2 Market Capitalisation Guidelines
Table A2.1: Market Capitalisation Guidelines.
Panel A: Nasdaq Nordic
Lower Bound (EUR) Upper Bound (EUR)
Small Cap - 150 000 000
Mid Cap 150 000 000 1 000 000 000
Large Cap 1 000 000 000 -
Panel B: Oslo Børs
Lower Bound (NOK) Upper Bound (NOK)
Small Cap - 1 000 000 000
Mid Cap 1 000 000 000 15 000 000 000
Large Cap 15 000 000 000 -
Table A2.1 summarises the market capitalisation guidelines applied. For the Swedish, Finish, and Danish
market, they are defined by the Nasdaq Nordic guidelines defined by the latest yearly Market Cap Segment
Review. Firms listed at Oslo Børs follow the guidelines provided by Oslo Børs. Market capitalization
were retrieved in USD, and converted to following exchange rates based on rates as of 5th October 2020.
USD/EUR = 0.85, USD/NOK = 9.28.
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A2.3 Clustered Event Dates
Table A2.3: Summary Statistics for Observed ESG Score Changes 2011-2020
Event date Negative Neutral Positive Event date Negative Neutral Positive
03/01-11 2 2 0 31/12-15 29 53 35
29/04-11 0 0 1 29/04-16 0 1 0
30/05-11 0 1 0 30/05-16 0 1 0
30/08-11 1 0 0 30/08-16 0 1 0
29/09-11 1 0 0 29/09-16 0 1 0
30/11-11 1 0 0 30/11-16 1 0 1
31/12-11 35 43 31 31/12-16 36 64 31
29/04-12 0 0 1 31/03-17 1 0 0
30/05-12 0 0 1 29/04-17 1 2 0
30/08-12 0 0 1 30/05-17 0 1 0
29/09-12 0 1 0 30/08-17 0 1 0
30/11-12 1 0 1 29/09-17 1 0 0
31/12-12 39 45 26 01/11-17 0 1 0
29/04-13 0 0 1 30/11-17 0 2 0
30/05-13 0 1 0 31/12-17 33 75 23
30/08-13 0 1 0 01/03-18 1 0 0
29/09-13 0 1 0 30/03-18 0 0 1
01/11-13 0 1 0 29/04-18 0 2 1
30/11-13 1 0 0 30/05-18 1 0 0
30/12-13 0 1 0 30/08-18 0 2 0
31/12-13 32 63 14 29/09-18 0 2 0
30/04-14 1 0 0 01/11-18 0 1 0
30/05-14 0 1 0 30/11-18 0 0 2
30/08-14 0 1 0 31/12-18 13 89 41
29/09-14 0 1 0 01/03-19 0 1 0
01/11-14 0 1 0 30/03-19 0 0 1
30/11-14 0 1 1 29/04-19 0 1 2
31/12-14 37 51 24 30/05-19 0 0 1
30/04-15 0 1 0 30/08-19 1 1 0
30/05-15 1 0 0 29/09-19 1 1 1
30/08-15 0 0 1 30/11-19 1 0 1
29/09-15 0 0 1 31/12-19 49 116 70
02/11-15 0 1 0 25/02-20 1 0 0
30/11-15 0 2 0 29/02-20 0 0 1
30/03-20 0 1 0
Table A2.3 summarises every date an ESG Score change, meaning an announcement for a firm which had
a pre-existing ESG Score, was observed in the time period 2011 to 2020 for our sample of Nordic firms.
Positive events are defined as ESG score year-on-year change more than 10.61%. Negative events are
defined as y/y change of less than -2.77%. Neutral events are defined as y/y change less than 10.61% and
more than -2.77%.
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A2.4 Industry Segmentation Guide
Table A2.5: Industry Segmentation by Thomson Reuters Standards.
Energy Real estate
Energy - Fossil fuels Real estate
Renewble energy Collective investments
Uranium Investment holding companies
Materials Technology
Chemicals Technology equipment
Mineral resources Software and IT services
Applied resources Telecommunication services
Industrials Healthcare
Industrial goods Healthcare services and equipment
Industrial and commercial services Pharmaceuticals and medical research
Consumer goods conglomerates
Transportation
Consumer cyclicals Academic and educational services




Consumer non cyclicals Government activity
Food and beverages
Personal and household products and services
Food and drug retailing
Financials Institutions associations and




Table A2.4 displays the industry segmentation guide by Thomson Reuters.
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A2.5 Original BMP Test and Rank Test Results
Table A2.7: Summary Statistics for Original BMP Test and Rank Test.
Panel: A - Positive events
Event window N ACAR BMP Adj.BMP C&Z GRANKT
[-5,5] 315 0.0114 2.9516*** 2.1461** 1.6673* 1.5004
[-3,3] 315 0.0067 2.4325** 1.7692* 1.3044 2.4176**
[-1,1] 311 0.0040 2.0539** 1.4938 1.2889 1.4857
[-5,0] 316 0.0105 3.4295*** 2.4943** 2.1191** 1.4153
[-3,0] 316 0.0077 3.5679*** 2.5950** 2.0816** 2.9044**
[-1,0] 316 0.0057 3.2751*** 2.3821** 1.8135* 3.1446**
[0,1] 310 0.0031 1.6732* 1.2170 1.2842 1.4967
[0,3] 314 0.0037 1.2189 0.8865 0.6933 0.7323
[0,5] 315 0.0052 1.4401 1.0474 0.9737 1.2798
[0,10] 315 0.0046 1.4012 1.0191 0.5945 1.5746
Panel: B - Negative events
Event window N ACAR BMP Adj.BMP C&Z GRANKT
[-5,5] 321 0.0115 2.6281*** 1.8911* 1.6900* 2.9962***
[-3,3] 319 0.0064 1.8124* 1.3041 1.0328 1.3998
[-1,1] 321 0.0060 2.5606** 1.8425* 1.1239 2.5557**
[-5,0] 322 0.0090 2.5909** 1.8643* 1.9473* 3.2648***
[-3,0] 322 0.0059 2.2303** 1.6049 1.5226 2.8375***
[-1,0] 322 0.0053 2.9153*** 2.0978** 1.5450 1.6847*
[0,1] 320 0.0030 0.9160 0.6591 0.1557 0.9855
[0,3] 318 0.0026 0.4762 0.3426 -0.1409 0.5441
[0,5] 321 0.0047 1.1427 0.8222 0.4871 1.9840**
[0,10] 321 0.0044 0.4890 0.3519 -0.4798 0.8694
Panel: C - Neutral events
Event window N ACAR BMP Adj.BMP C&Z GRANKT
[-5,5] 639 0.0065 1.3258 0.9130 0.3773 1.4821
[-3,3] 637 0.0052 1.6676* 1.1484 0.0330 -0.0494
[-1,1] 637 0.0032 1.6896* 1.1635 -0.1024 0.0173
[-5,0] 640 0.0043 1.4764 1.0167 1.1268 1.1065
[-3,0] 640 0.0050 2.5403** 1.7494* 1.2375 1.6939*
[-1,0] 640 0.0037 2.7925*** 1.9231* 0.7533 1.1376
[0,1] 635 0.0012 -0.3368 -0.2319 -0.9553 -0.0750
[0,3] 635 0.0017 -0.3018 -0.2078 -1.3705 -1.9289*
[0,5] 637 0.0038 0.2240 0.1542 -0.7445 -0.4780
[0,10] 637 0.0022 -0.2559 -0.1762 -1.1367 -0.9883
Table A2.7 summarises test results for positive, negative, and neutral events. Average cumulative abnormal
returns (ACAR) are associated with the defined event window for the respective event day. Positive
events are defined as ESG Score year-on-year > 10.61%. Negative events are defined as y/y change <
-2.77%. Neutral events are defined as y/y change less than 10.61% and more than -2.77%. H0 of no
abnormal returns is tested with the original BMP test (BMP)(Boehmer et al., 1991), adjusted BMP test
(Adj.BMP)(Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010), Cumulative Rank N-test (C&Z)(Corrado and Zivney, 1992) and
the Generalized Rank T-test (GRANK)(Kolari and Pynnonen, 2011). N: Number of events. Significance
levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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A3.1 Probit Regression Correlation
Table A3.1: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables for Probit and Multionomial
Logit Regressions.
Panel: A - Positive events
Ebitda ROA Beta ln.asset ln.mcap ESG.d Fossil.d Bank.d Time.d
Ebitda 1.000
ROA 0.265 1.000
Beta 0.048 0.033 1.000
ln.asset 0.331 -0.039 0.116 1.000
ln.mcap 0.258 0.261 0.140 0.705 1.000
ESG.d 0.061 0.098 0.138 0.245 0.336 1.000
Fossil.d 0.195 -0.116 0.386 0.007 -0.109 0.015 1.000
Bank.d 0.175 -0.101 0.001 0.397 0.070 -0.012 -0.099 1.000
Time.d 0.023 0.021 -0.071 -0.120 -0.135 -0.035 0.006 0.055 1.000
Panel: B - Negative events
Ebitda ROA Beta ln.asset ln.mcap ESG.d Fossil.d Bank.d Time.d
Ebitda 1.000
ROA 0.156 1.000
Beta -0.007 -0.143 1.000
ln.asset 0.151 -0.155 0.075 1.000
ln.mcap 0.068 0.236 0.058 0.752 1.000
ESG.d 0.069 0.145 0.044 0.305 0.410 1.000
Fossil.d 0.028 -0.208 0.421 -0.058 -0.123 -0.104 1.000
Bank.d 0.035 -0.141 -0.072 0.558 0.222 0.005 -0.120 1.000
Time.d -0.070 0.092 -0.078 -0.168 -0.095 0.046 -0.043 0.015 1.000
Table A3.1 show the correlation matrix between the independent variables used both for the probit and
the multinominal regression. Ebitda: EBITDA margin (Percentage measure calculated by EBITDA/total
sales for firm i). ROA: Return on assets (Percentage metric calculated by income after taxes for fiscal
year (FY) divided by average total assets of FY). ln.asset: Natural logarithm of average total assets in
FY. ln.mcap: Natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of FY (Calculated by last share price
of FY*total shares outstanding). ESG.d: Dummy variable which equals 1 if ESG scores >50 for previous
year, and 0 otherwise. Fossil.d: Dummy variable equal 1 if company i operates in the fossil fuel sector.
Bank.id: Dummy variable equal 1 if company i operates in the banking sector. Time.d: Time dummy
that equals 1 if the observation was in 2017 or later. Correlation is calculated by the Pearson correlation
coefficient.
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A3.2 Probit Regression Marginal Effects
Table A3.3: Marginal Effects From Probit Regression for Positive and Negative Events.
Dependent variable
(1 = Positive CAR, 0 = Negative CAR)
Panel A: Positive events
Event window [-1,0] Event window [-3,0]
Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4)
Beta -0.0485 -0.0264 0.0068 0.0437
ROA -0.1851 0.0343 0.0064 0.2123
Ebitda -0.1127 -0.0799 0.0271 0.0529
ln.asset -0.0387* - -0.0424* -
ln.mcap - -0.0725*** - -0.0983***
ESG.d -0.0154 0.0118 -0.0174 0.0303
Fossil.d 0.1269 0.0831 0.1616 0.0950
Bank.d 0.1134 0.0498 -0.0248 -0.0901
Time.d 0.1475*** 0.1370** 0.1725*** 0.1577***
Panel B: Negative events
Event window [-1,0] Event window [-5,0]
Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4)
Beta -0.0286 -0.0204 -0.1336* -0.1398**
ROA -1.0776*** -0.7107** -0.5113* -0.2624
Ebitda 0.1662 0.1449 -0.0437 -0.0463
ln.asset -0.0552*** - -0.0569*** -
ln.mcap - -0.0695*** - -0.0414*
ESG.d -0.0868 -0.0776 -0.0732 -0.0940
Fossil.d -0.0432 -0.0461 0.0471 0.0484
Bank.d 0.1731 0.0906 0.1132 -0.0128
Time.d 0.1628*** 0.1713*** 0.0084 0.0255
Table A3.3 summarises marginal effects from probit regression for event window [-1,0] and [-3,0] for
positive events and event window [-1,0] and [-5,0] for negative events. Positive events are identified with
an ESG Score year-on-year change of more than 10.61%. Negative events are identified with y/y change
of -2.77%. The dependent variable is a binary variable with 2 possible outcomes where 1 = Positive
cumulative abnormal return (CAR), and 0 = Negative CAR. Marginal effects are estimated by:
@Y
@Xi
=  i ( 0 +  1Beta +  2Ebitda +  3ROA +  4ln.asset +  5ln.mcap +  6ESG.d +  7Fossil.d
+  8Bank.id). Beta: Stock volatility(stock return variation in relation to market return variation) in
estimation window for firm i. Ebitda: EBITDA margin (Percentage measure calculated by EBITDA/total
sales for firm i). ROA: Return on assets (Calculated as income after taxes for fiscal year (FY) divided by
average total assets of FY). ln.asset: Natural logarithm of average total assets in FY. ln.mcap: Natural
logarithm of market capitalization at the end of FY (Calculated by last share price of FY*total shares
outstanding). ESG.d: Dummy variable which equals to 1 if ESG scores >50 for previous year, and 0
otherwise. Fossil.d: Dummy variable equal to 1 if company i operates in the fossil fuel sector. Bank.id:
Dummy variable equal to 1 if company i operates in the banking sector. Time.d: Time dummy that
equals 1 if the observation was in 2017 or later. Model (1): Variable ln.mcap excluded. Model (2):
Variable ln.asset is excluded. Model (3): Variable ln.mcap is excluded. Model (4): Variable ln.asset is
excluded. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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A4.1 Multinominal Regression
In order to investigate whether specific firm characteristics are more likely to be affiliated
with positive or negative events, logit regression is applied. Logit regression is a maximum
likelihood technique, which uses explanatory variables to maximise the probability of
observing a discrete outcome.
A logit model that allows for multiple outcomes in the dependent variable, which is the
case here with positive, negative and neutral events, is called a multinominal logit model
(Borooah, 2002). Following outcomes in the dependent variable are defined: 0 = Neutral
event, 1 = Positive event, and 2 = Negative event. Note that the outcomes are nominal,
meaning they are not ordered33.
The multinominal logit regression does assume independence of irrelevance alternatives
(IIA)34. This assumption implies that the odds of a given outcome for the dependent
variable, is not affected of the addition or removal of a possible outcome outcome (Borooah,
2002). Intuitively, it is reasonable to believe that the likelihood of a specific event is
unaffected by removing either the positive, neutral or negative outcome. Furthermore,
our three groups surrounds the whole data set, meaning an added outcome would not
affect the outcome for the dependent variable either. The IIA assumption is therefore
assumed to hold.
Results are presented in Table A4.1. Results indicate that the likelihood of a negative
event compared to a neutral event has a negative relationship with ESG.d and T ime.d.
Additionally, results indicate a positive relationship for negative events with Bank.d and
Fossil.d. The likelihood of a positive event has a negative relationship with the ESG.d,
and results indicate a positive relationship with ROA. There is also some weak evidence
of a negative relationship between ln.mcap and positive events.
33Ordered would have meant outcome 1 is better than 0, and 2 is better than 1.
34Other assumptions are independent observations, mutually exclusive outcomes and no
multicollinearity for explanatory variables. The first are assumed to hold while the latter two holds as an
event can only be classified as either positive, neutral or negative, and no multicollinearity are ensured by
choice of explanatory variables.
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Table A4.1: Multinominal Logit Regression Analysis.
Firm characteristics associated with positive and negative events
(Parameter estimates)
0 = Neutral event
1 = Negative event, 2 = Positive event
Panel A: Negative events
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Ebitda -0.1668 -0.1643 - -
ROA - - 0.5737 1.0261
ln.asset -0.0655 - -0.0787 -
ln.mcap - -0.0683 - -0.1027*
ESG.d -0.4734*** -0.4669*** -0.4985*** -0.4626***
Fossil.d 0.4967** 0.4580* 0.4985* 0.4751*
Bank.d 0.7137** 0.5509** 0.7284** 0.5788**
Time.d -0.5801*** -0.5672*** -0.5778*** -0.5669***
cons 1.3219 1.3695 1.5539 1.2570
Panel B: Positive events
Ebitda 0.2405 0.2195 - -
ROA - - 0.4528* 1.9316**
ln.asset -0.1161* - -0.0976 -
ln.mcap - -0.0874 - -0.1190*
ESG.d -1.9066*** -1.9323*** -1.9453*** -1.9243***
Fossil.d 0.2296 0.1719 0.3707 0.3370
Bank.d 0.4316 0.1640 0.5182 0.3370
Time.d 0.1004 -0.0685 -0.0978 -0.0851
cons 2.7976 2.1682 2.3636* 2.7759**
N 1250 1250 1250 1250
Pseudo R2 0.0863 0.0857 0.0854 0.0858
Table A4.1 summarises the results for the multinomial regression analysis. The dependent variable is a
multinominal variable with 3 possible outcomes where 0 = Neutral event, 1 = Negative event and 2 =
Positive event. Neutral events are defined as base for the regression. Results do for this reason interpreted
relative to neutral events. Positive events are identified with an ESG score year-on-year change of more
than 10.61%. Negative events are identified with y/y change of -2.77%. Neutral events are identified as
y/y change lower than 10.61% and higher than -2.77%. Ebitda: EBITDA margin (Percentage measure
calculated by EBITDA/total sales for firm i). ROA: total return on assets (Percentage metric calculated
by income after taxes for fiscal year divided by average total assets of the fiscal year (FY)). ln.asset:
Natural logarithm of average total assets of the FY. ln.mcap: Natural logarithm of market capitalization
at the end of FY (Calculated by: Last share price of FY*total shares outstanding). ESG.d: Dummy
variable which equals to 1 for ESG scores >50 for previous FY and 0 otherwise. Fossil.d: Dummy variable
equal to 1 if company i operates in the fossil fuel sector. Bank.id: Dummy variable equal to 1 if company
i operates in the banking sector. Time.d: Time dummy that equals 1 if the observation was in 2017 or
later. cons: Regression constant. N: Total number of observations. Pseudo R2: Mc Faddens R2. Model
(1): Multinomial regression without the independent variable ln.mcap. Model (2): Multinomial regression
without the independent variable ln.asset. Model (3): Variables ROA and ln.mcap are excluded. Model
(4): Variables ESG.d and ln.asset are excluded. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *,
**, and ***, respectively.
